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WHAT IS A LAWYER? 
A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE LAWYER AS AN OFFICER OF THE 
COURT 
DEBORAH M. HUSSEY FREELAND* 
ABSTRACT 
 This paper engages with the central question in legal ethics concerning the 
lawyer’s role, analyzing this fundamental question in terms of professional 
identity.  Literature in this debate frames the lawyer either as a professional 
who exists entirely to serve her client (the “standard conception”), or as a 
professional whose primary duties are to the legal system.  I reposit and 
examine the lawyer’s professional identity as an officer of the court—an 
identity marginalized by those who favor the standard conception—noting that 
“standard conception” was coined to draw attention to a supplanting threat to 
legal professionalism.  Providing a uniquely detailed examination of U.S. 
Supreme Court jurisprudence and of U.S. judicial system structure and 
function, this investigation yields strong and consistent evidence that the 
lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court is the actual, legal standard 
conception of the lawyer, as well as the defining basis of her identity—her sine 
qua non. 
 Viewing the formation of the lawyer’s professional identity as an instance 
of the formation of an identity generally, in terms of its interpellation, 
socialization, and potential suspension or destruction, and examining the 
nature of that identity in terms of its performance, suggests that the lawyer’s 
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role as court officer gives rise to, encompasses and circumscribes her role as a 
client advocate: a court creates a lawyer to exercise her independent 
professional judgment in translating between public and private realms, 
assisting in the formation of binding connections between the two in 
accordance with the rule of law.  This observation reconciles a popular 
conception of the lawyer with her legal conception, usefully reframing an 
entrenched debate in legal ethics. 
 This novel theoretical approach further suggests that the lawyer’s identity 
and professional actions can be understood as links in chains of softly 
dialectical synthetic acts that reify the private individual in publicly intelligible 
forms.  Though this analysis may sound abstract, theorizing the lawyer’s 
professional identity is a practical endeavor that considers how procedural 
justice and the rule of law are effected in substantial part through the lawyer’s 
professional performance from day to day, and offers to lawyers and law 
students an understanding of the lawyer’s roles and functions in the 
administration of justice that affirms their sense of duty to the courts and helps 
them to protect themselves from subversion. 
INTRODUCTION 
 Aspiring lawyers, seasoned practitioners, and scholars urgently debate the 
meaning of life—as a lawyer.  What does it mean to be a lawyer, and what 
should a lawyer do?  Use her professional skills to get all she can for her 
client?  Does she have any meaningful obligation to serve justice or the court 
in her work for a client, or are gestures in those directions merely rhetorical 
flourishes that do not and should not really affect her practice? 
 This analysis encounters images of the lawyer in two frames, 
foregrounding her duties as either a creature of the court or a tool of the client.  
Some commentators attempt to resolve conflicts between the lawyer’s roles in 
these frames by arguing that only one frame holds the true or realistic picture 
of the lawyer.  Some trace the notion of a lawyer as a professional having 
public duties to the incipience of the profession and emphasize that a lawyer 
has a duty to serve justice (while also advocating for her client); others argue 
that a lawyer is simply an agent of the client, owing no real duties to whatever 
justice may be, or to her profession, other than those of client advocacy. 
 Examining the creation and regulation of the lawyer yields a perspective 
that encompasses the either and the or, showing how the officer and the 
advocate coextend.  Theirs are ties among the individual and the collective, the 
private and the public, the might-makes-right and the rule of law.  Individual 
lawyers are fully enmeshed in both roles.  A lawyer may feel quandaried by 
perceived conflicts of interest between her duties of service to the court and of 
client advocacy; the debating bodies of literature feel for the lawyer caught in 
role strain between these two nets, and worry her ties to one frame or the other.  
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The following analysis relieves the lawyer of neither, but finds a realm of 
harmony among their ostensible divergences. 
 I approach these questions by considering what lawyers are, examining 
how they are made by whom, and to what end.  A lawyer is commonly 
described as an officer of the court, though the significance of her status as 
such is contested.  A lawyer is also described as an advocate for her client, 
though some courts question whether “zealous” advocacy is ethical advocacy.  
When these descriptions are thought to conflict, the former role is often 
relegated to a rhetorical or aspirational realm, while the latter seems 
undeniable.  However, unmooring the lawyer’s representation of the client 
from the functions of the court of justice undermines the public’s fundamental 
interest in the rule of law. 
 In legal historical and common law discussions of the lawyer’s functions, I 
find support for the hypothesis that it matters that the lawyer is an officer of the 
court.  To assess the extent to which these discussions indicate either a merely 
aspirational or a fully realized role for the lawyer, I consider how someone 
becomes a lawyer and how a lawyer is related to a court.  To complement these 
legal and structural analyses, I draw from theories of identity formation, 
Hegelian dialectics, and reification to explore what lawyers are.  I find that the 
lawyer manifests, performs and persists as an officer of the court: if the lawyer 
had not been appointed by the court to assist in its administration of justice, she 
would not be a lawyer, and she would not be present to re-present her client as 
a party to a legal action.  The lawyer’s duties of representation run to the court 
and to the client—and the latter depend from the former.  The lawyer’s 
professional identity as an officer of the court matters to the individual lawyer 
who may be troubled by perceiving herself narrowly as a zealous advocate, and 
matters as well to the efforts of our judicial system in effecting the rule of law. 
I.  HOW DO LAWYERS HAPPEN? 
A. Legal History 
 While a comprehensive history of the lawyer’s role lies beyond the scope 
of this paper, it is useful to examine relevant aspects of English law that persist 
in our inheritance.  A most influential source, William Blackstone’s 
Commentaries on the Laws of England is cited heavily by U.S. courts seeking 
legal historical information.1  According to Blackstone, lawyers who represent 
parties in court: 
 
 1. For example, Westlaw searches identify 373 citations to Blackstone’s Commentaries on 
the Laws of England in the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court (256 in majority or leading 
opinions), and 5,382 such citations in federal and state courts (4,505 in majority or lead opinions).  
See also Albert W. Alschuler, Rediscovering Blackstone, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 1–17 (1996) 
(offering a history of Blackstone’s influence on U.S. law, and collecting citations). 
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are admitted to the execution of their office by the superior courts . . . and are 
in all points officers of the respective courts in which they are admitted: and, 
as they have many privileges on account of their attendance there, so they are 
peculiarly subject to the censure and animadversion of the judges.  No man can 
practise as an attorney in any of those courts, but such as is admitted and sworn 
an attorney of that particular court . . . .2 
That is, the court creates the lawyer, who is its officer.  Further, this office 
affords to the lawyer privileges only as she is subject to the court’s discipline.  
The court creates the lawyer through its acts of admitting a person to the bar 
and binding her to its service through her sworn oath: without the court’s acts, 
no one can act as a lawyer—thus, no one can represent a party before it. 
 Blackstone indicates not only that lawyers are officers of the court, but 
moreover, that the lawyer’s role as the court’s officer is her sine qua non.  
Blackstone’s description of the lawyer maps with fidelity onto modern U.S. 
lawyers, as discussed below.  At a minimum, relevant legal history supports 
the hypothesis that a lawyer is an officer of the court, even as she is also a 
client advocate. 
B. Court Authority: The Lawyer Is an Officer of the Court, Sui Generis 
 To find the most authoritative contours of the common-law meaning of 
“officer of the court,” I analyze instances of its use in the opinions of the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  I find that while different aspects of its meaning are 
emphasized in different contexts, a fundamentally consistent definition is 
clearly identifiable.  This observation is helpful in sorting out confusion in the 
literature about what it means for a lawyer to be an officer of the court. 
 A lawyer is clearly an “officer of the court,” as is demonstrated by the 
Court’s use of the term in a variety of contexts.3  There are also other genres of 
 
 2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 26 (1769) 
(italics added). 
 3. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986) (“[W]hile we share respondent’s 
distaste for the deliberate misleading of an officer of the court, reading Miranda to forbid police 
deception of an attorney ‘would cut [the decision] completely loose from its own explicitly stated 
rationale.’” (emphasis retained) (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976))); 
United States v. Sells Eng’g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 466 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[A]ttorneys for the Justice Department are officers of the court bound to high ethical 
standards.”), superseded by statute on other grounds; Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) 
(“In the face of the unequivocal and uncontradicted statement by a responsible officer of the court 
that he was fully prepared and ‘ready’ for trial, it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a 
continuance.”); Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 601 n.27 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
concurring) (“As officers of the court, court personnel and attorneys have a fiduciary 
responsibility not to engage in public debate that will redound to the detriment of the accused or 
that will obstruct the fair administration of justice.” (emphasis added)); Mayer v. Chicago, 404 
U.S. 189, 199–200 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (referring to “the duty of counsel as officers 
of the court to seek only what [transcripts are] needed”); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 520 
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officer of the court.  For example, judicial officers exercise discretion to decide 
the common law, while administrative officers do not.4  The lawyer is neither 
of these.5  Instead, the lawyer exercises independent professional discretion in 
providing counsel6 to a client, within bounds set by the court.  The lawyer is a 
special kind of officer, functioning not within the legislative or executive 
realms but the judicial, and then not as a judge or administrator, but in a unique 
sense.  Accordingly, when the Court distinguishes a lawyer from a political 
officer or from an administrative or ministerial officer of the court, the Court 
does not divest the lawyer of her office, but simply indicates what kind of 
officer she is. 
 For example, the Court notes that a prosecutor requires immunity from 
liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when functioning “as ‘an officer of the 
court,’”7 so that she may exercise her professional judgment in performing her 
 
(1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) (“The special responsibilities that [petitioner attorney] assumes as 
licensee of the State and officer of the court do not carry with them a diminution, however 
limited, of his Fifth Amendment rights.”); Willner v. Comm. on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 
96, 107 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Committee members are usually unpaid and serve in 
fulfillment of their obligation to the profession and as officers of the court.”); Am. Commc’ns 
Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 405 (1950) (“[T]he relation between the obligations of 
membership in the bar and service required by the state in time of war . . . and the strong interest 
which every state court has in the persons who become officers of the court were thought 
sufficient to justify the state action.”); Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 161 (1949) (“[T]he 
relationship of the petitioner [a lawyer] as an officer of the court must not be lost sight of.”); 
Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12 (1933) (“A talesman, sworn as a juror, becomes, like an 
attorney, an officer of the court, and must submit to like restraints.”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (“Attorneys are officers of the court, and are bound to render service when 
required by such an appointment.”); Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 226 (1932) (“Nor can it be 
doubted that the petitioner here, notwithstanding his presence as an attorney and officer of the 
court in the conduct of the principal cause, was not immune from the service of process . . . .”); 
Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624, 631 (1916) (holding that, “[c]onsidering Holmes’ position as 
an officer of the court” and other factors, he had received due process); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 
289, 305–06 (1888) (identifying the petitioner as “an attorney, and, therefore, an officer of the 
court”); Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 512–13 (1873) (“The order of admission is the 
judgment of the court that they possess the requisite qualifications both in character and learning.  
They become by such admission officers of the court . . . .”). 
 4. See, e.g., Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 436–37 & n.11 (1993) 
(distinguishing judges from court reporters, and noting that “[a] court stenographer, 
notwithstanding the fact that he is an officer of the court, by the very nature of his work performs 
no judicial function.  His duties are purely ministerial and administrative; he has no power of 
decision.” (citation omitted)). 
 5. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399, 405 (1956) (“Certainly nothing that was said in 
Ex parte Garland or in any other case decided by this Court places attorneys in the same category 
as marshals, bailiffs, court clerks or judges.”). 
 6. Oxford English Dictionary Online, counsel, n., I.1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“Interchange of 
opinions on a matter of procedure[.]”). 
 7. Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 128 S. Ct. 855, 861–62 (2009). 
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“basic trial advocacy duties”8 independently of the threat of a retaliatory 
lawsuit from a criminal defendant.9  The Court thus identifies the prosecutor as 
an officer of the court with a basic duty to advocate for the State—her 
advocacy duties inhere in her role as an officer of the court, and are 
distinguishable from other administrative duties she may have that are deemed 
functionally not to pertain to that role.10  Her role as an officer of the court 
affords the prosecutor immunity to support her advocacy function—which 
flows from and does not relieve her of her primary duty to uphold the law and 
protect the integrity of the judicial process.11 
 In a contrasting example, the Court regards the public defender differently 
from the prosecutor in informative respects.  In Ferri v. Ackerman the Court 
defines another contour of the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court: a lawyer 
appointed pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act by a federal court to represent 
an indigent criminal defendant was deemed not to be entitled to absolute 
immunity from a malpractice suit by the defendant.12  Though both are federal 
officers, the pivotal difference between the prosecutor (who represents the 
state) and the public defender (who represents a client against the state) is that 
to perform her duties of representation as an officer of the court, the public 
defender must be able “to act independently of the Government and oppose it 
 
 8. Id. at 863. 
 9. Id. at 859 (“Over a half-century ago Chief Judge Learned Hand explained that a 
prosecutor’s absolute immunity reflects ‘a balance’ of ‘evils.’  ‘[I]t has been thought in the end 
better,’ he said, ‘to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those 
who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation.’” (quoting Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 
F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949))). 
 10. Id. at 861–862; see also Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.33 (1976): 
  We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as advocate for the State 
involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the 
courtroom. . . . At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt 
functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court.  Drawing a proper line 
between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us 
to anticipate them. 
Notably, drawing a line between these functions does not negate the officer-of-the-court function.  
See also Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273–74 (1993) (applying the functional test of 
Imbler to distinguish the prosecutor-as-investigator from the prosecutor as advocate-and-officer 
of the court); Johnson v. Rex, 474 U.S. 967, 967 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (“Here the prosecutor was acting as an officer of the court in ensuring compliance with 
the Miranda requirements . . . .”). 
 11. See, e.g., United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 522 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part): 
It is difficult to imagine that a series of intentional violations of defendants’ constitutional 
rights by Government prosecutors who are officers of the court charged with upholding 
the law would not have a considerable detrimental effect on the integrity of the process 
and call for judicial action designed to restore order and integrity to the process. 
 12. 444 U.S. 193 (1979). 
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in adversary litigation.”13  The Court held that because the lawyer had been 
appointed to represent a party adverse to the state, the primary rationale for 
granting immunity to judges and prosecutors who need “the maximum ability 
to deal fearlessly and impartially with the public at large”14 did not apply to 
her: while immunity from liability to a criminal defendant “for certain claims 
arising out of the performance of their official duties”15 helps the judge and 
prosecutor perform their official functions, such immunity from suit by a client 
criminal defendant would not help appointed defense counsel perform her 
official function as a court officer entrusted with representing the accused. 
 Even as it distinguishes her from “other federal officers[,]”16 the Court 
explicitly recognizes and treats defense counsel as a “federal officer”17 and 
officer of the court: 
There is, however, a marked difference between the nature of counsel’s 
responsibilities and those of other officers of the court.  As public servants, the 
prosecutor and the judge represent the interest of society as a whole. . . . 
. . . [The] duty [of appointed counsel] is not to the public at large, except in 
that general way.  His principal responsibility is to serve the undivided 
interests of his client.  Indeed, an indispensable element of the effective 
performance of his responsibilities is the ability to act independently of the 
Government and to oppose it in adversary litigation.18 
By ignoring the bolded language, one could mistakenly read Ferri to state that 
defense counsel is not an officer of the court, and owes duties only to the 
undivided interests of her client.  Instead—even in this limit of representing the 
private criminal defendant against the public—the Court maintains the 
lawyer’s foundational duty to the public as an officer of the court.  Then, given 
that duty, her principal responsibility as a public defender is to represent 
criminal defendants against the state. 
 Similarly, a public defender is not deemed to be a state actor in certain 
respects, because her duty to the state to assist in providing a fair trial to the 
criminally accused requires her to advocate a position that is adverse to the 
state.  For example, in Georgia v. McCollum the Court relies on Polk County v. 
Dodson in distinguishing an officer of the court from a state actor under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.19  In Dodson Chief Justice Burger emphasizes that, “[t]he 
 
 13. Id. at 204. 
 14. Id. at 203. 
 15. Id. at 202. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Ferri, 444 U.S. at 202. 
 18. Id. at 202–04 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 19. 505 U.S. 42, 64 (1992) (“‘[U]nder color of state law’ for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 . . . ‘a lawyer representing a client is not, by virtue of being an officer of the court, a state 
actor[.]” (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added to limiting language) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. 
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advocate, as an officer of the court which issued the commission to practice, 
owes an obligation to the court to repudiate any external effort to direct how 
the obligations to the client are to be carried out,”20 including efforts made by 
the lawyer’s employer.  At the time of his writing, a showing of state 
employment ordinarily would suffice to establish that the employee was a state 
actor; for the public defender, however, the Court required not only state 
employment but also a functional analysis to determine whether the public 
defender was acting under color of state law.21 
 In Dodson the Chief Justice peels the onion of the lawyer’s duties, which 
run first to the court that commissioned her as its officer, in turn to represent 
the accused client against the state—and emphasizes that this duty-structure is 
independent of the lawyer’s source of compensation.  This point has at least as 
much force when the client is not adverse to the state: the lawyer is an officer 
of the court who serves the court by representing a client before it, regardless 
of whether and how much the client pays the lawyer for the service of 
representation.22  To the extent that the “standard conception” of the lawyer 
relies on the client’s payment for the lawyer’s legal services, the standard 
conception is insupportable.23 
 
Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318 (1981) (explaining that “a defense lawyer characteristically opposes 
the designated representatives of the State[,]” because the “system assumes that adversarial 
testing will ultimately advance the public interest in truth and fairness”))).  On the latter point, see 
also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 724 n.14 (1973) (“[T]he duty of the lawyer, subject to his role 
as an ‘officer of the court,’ is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when 
those interests are in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a State.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 20. 454 U.S. at 327 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
 21. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 54. 
 22. See, e.g., FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 453 (1990) (Blackmun, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Attorneys are not merely participants in a 
competitive market for legal services; they are officers of the court.”); People ex rel. Karlin v. 
Culkin, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928) (citation omitted): 
“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.”  The appellant was 
received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private gain.  He became an 
officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends 
of justice. 
Chief Judge Cardozo’s description of the lawyer as an instrument in the administration of justice 
who does not manifest exclusively as a businessperson has been quoted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 281 (1957), In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 644 
(1985), and Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 
296, 310 (1989) (holding that a lawyer could not be compelled to represent an indigent client pro 
bono exclusively on the basis of permissive, not mandatory, statutory authority: “We emphasize 
that our decision today is limited to interpreting § 1915(d).  We do not mean to question, let alone 
denigrate, lawyers’ ethical obligation to assist those who are too poor to afford counsel . . . . On 
the contrary . . . .”). 
 23. See also infra Part II.B. 
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 In Griffiths the Court makes a similar distinction in considering the 
Constitutionality of a state’s requiring citizenship for admission to its bar: 
though lawyers are officers of the court, they are not therefore political 
officers; thus, a bar applicant may be required to take the oath of office in good 
faith, but may not be required to be a citizen of the state.24  The Griffiths Court 
opines that “the duty of the lawyer, subject to his role as an ‘officer of the 
court,’ is to further the interests of his clients by all lawful means, even when 
those interests are in conflict with the interests of the United States or of a 
State.”25  This description of the lawyer is vulnerable to misinterpretation: a 
citation that elides or simply ignores the bolded language strips the lawyer of 
her primary professional identity as an officer of the court, rendering her 
merely an agent of her client. 
 Instead, the distinctions articulated by the Court between a lawyer and a 
state official are actually distinctions between a lawyer qua officer of the court, 
and an elected official—rather than denials that the lawyer holds any kind of 
office.  For some Justices, even this distinction hems the lawyer’s role too 
high: 
  I am unwilling to accept what seems to me a denigration of the posture and 
role of a lawyer as an “officer of the court.” . . . In the common-law tradition 
the lawyer becomes the attorney—the agent—for [the] client only by virtue of 
his having been first invested with power by the State, usually by a court.26 
Distinction between the officer of the court and the political officer may 
strengthen the independence and credibility of the judiciary by separating the 
judicial from the other branches of government: the affirmation that the lawyer 
is a court officer indicates that the lawyer clearly serves the state by assisting 
the judiciary in the administration of justice, though she does not directly 
determine state policy.  Chief Justice Burger and then-Justice Rehnquist 
resisted this distinction precisely because it may signal to some that a lawyer is 
not an officer at all, despite the Court’s care to explain that this is not the case: 
  The concept of a lawyer as an officer of the court and hence part of the 
official mechanism of justice in the sense of other court officers, including the 
judge, albeit with different duties, is not unique in our system but it is a 
significant feature of the lawyer’s role in the common law.  This concept has 
sustained some erosion over the years at the hands of cynics who view the 
lawyer much as the “hired gun” of the Old West.  In less flamboyant terms the 
 
 24. See, e.g., Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 729 (“Nor does the status of holding a license to practice 
law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make him a formulator of 
government policy.”); Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 (1985) (“Because, under 
Griffiths, a lawyer is not an ‘officer’ of the State in any political sense, there is no reason for New 
Hampshire to exclude from its bar nonresidents.” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
 25. 413 U.S. at 724 n.14 (emphasis added). 
 26. Id. at 730–31 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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lawyer in his relation to the client came to be called a “mouthpiece” in the 
gangland parlance of the 1930’s.27 
 Chief Justice Burger later dissented from the Court’s admission to practice 
before it several lawyers who had conducted themselves unprofessionally, out 
of concern that the Court was failing in its duty to uphold the integrity of 
judicial proceedings: 
“Their admission or their exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial 
power.  It is the exercise of judicial power. . . .” 
. . . [I]t is not a proper exercise of this Court’s judicial power merely to “rubber 
stamp” applications for admission.28 
Chief Justice Burger’s view in Patterson v. General Motors Corp. recalls that 
of Justice Field in Ex parte Garland,29 which was influenced by Judge 
Selden’s analysis in In re Cooper.30  Cooper reviewed the history of those who 
represent clients before a court over several hundred years; Judge Selden noted 
that “attorneys [are] a class of public officers”31—and “not only officers of the 
court, but officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a 
judicial nature.”32  Thus, though distinctions between the officer of the court 
and other kinds of public officer have arisen in various contexts over time, they 
have not unmoored the lawyer from her role as an officer of the court in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.33 
 The contexts in which these distinctions have placed the most pressure on 
the lawyer’s role as a subject of the court are—as in the context of the public 
defender adverse to the state—those in which the lawyer’s ability to exercise 
her independent professional judgment most requires protection.  The record in 
 
 27. Id. at 731. 
 28. Patterson v. General Motors Corp., 1981 U.S. Lexis 246, at *4 (May 18, 1981) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378–79 
(1867)); see also In re Caplinger, 1981 U.S. LEXIS 247, at *6 (May 18, 1981) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“Attorneys are officers of the court appointed to assist the court in the administration 
of justice.” (quoting In re Monaghan, 222 A.2d 665, 676 (Vt. 1966) (Holden, C.J., dissenting))); 
In re Brose, 1983 U.S. Lexis 166, at *9 (June 20, 1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“Of course an 
attorney is required to advocate zealously the interests of the client, but there are limits to that 
advocacy.  An attorney is an officer of the court . . . .”). 
 29. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378–79. 
 30. 22 N.Y. 67 (1860). 
 31. Id. at 90. 
 32. Id. at 84. 
 33. See, e.g., Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 378 (“Attorneys and counsellors are not officers 
of the United States; they are not elected or appointed in the manner prescribed by the 
Constitution for the election and appointment of such officers.  They are officers of the court, 
admitted as such by its order . . . .”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 351 (1974) 
(“Respondent’s suggestion would sweep all lawyers under the New York Times rule as officers of 
the court and distort the plain meaning of the ‘public official’ category [in First Amendment law] 
beyond all recognition.  We decline to follow it.”). 
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Cammer v. United States showed that a lawyer had worked methodically and 
resourcefully to ensure that he was using appropriate means to test a grand jury 
for bias against his client.34  The district court nonetheless held him in 
contempt for doing so, citing a statute that granted a court discretionary power 
to punish the “[m]isbehavior of any of its officers in their official 
transactions.”35  The Court noted that lawyers are officers of the court, but that 
a lawyer is not a conventional kind of officer.36  The Court emphasized that the 
lawyer is (also) engaged in a profession in which she makes her own decisions 
and runs her own business, to illustrate that lawyers need a space in which to 
exercise their professional judgment without fear of retribution from an unruly 
judge.37  The Cammer Court was working very carefully to protect the 
lawyer’s ability to exercise her independent professional judgment from the 
judge’s power to hold the lawyer in contempt without due process; to protect 
lawyers from this kind of arbitrary exercise of judicial power, the Court 
distinguished lawyers as officers of the court from other kinds of court officers 
to whom the statute would apply.  Thus, Cammer held narrowly that “a lawyer 
is not the kind of ‘officer’ who can be summarily tried for contempt under 18 
U.S.C. § 401(2)”38—Cammer did not hold that a lawyer is a businessperson 
rather than a court officer. 
 Indeed, Justice Reed concurred separately “solely on the ground that the 
circumstances leading to the enactment of this statute dictate the Court’s 
otherwise unique reading of the term ‘officers of the court.’”39  Although the 
Court has taken great care to preserve the lawyer’s identity as an officer of the 
court in distinguishing her from other kinds of officers, language like that in 
Cammer is vulnerable to chop-logic—to out-of-context quotation to prop the 
contrary assertion that a lawyer is not an officer of the court. 
 Like the Supreme Court, state courts regard lawyers as their officers, 
especially in providing for their appointment, regulation and dismissal—
processes by which the court invests the lawyer with a duty-bound office, 
 
 34. 350 U.S. 399, 400 (1956). 
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 401(2) (2006). 
 36. Cammer, 350 U.S. at 405. 
 37. Id. at 405–407.  Cammer recites the horror story of a Judge Peck who summarily had 
held an attorney in contempt after the attorney had published a criticism of one of the judge’s 
opinions; the judge later narrowly escaped impeachment, and the Contempt Act of 1831 was 
passed to prevent more such abuses of lawyers by judges.  Accordingly, this emphasis was made 
to protect lawyers from “subject[ion] to summary trials by judges without the safeguards of  
juries and regular court procedure.” Id. at 406–407. 
 38. Id. at 407–08. 
 39. Id. at 408 (Reed, J., concurring). 
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defines the officer’s functions, and suspends and removes a malfunctioning 
lawyer from that office.40 
 From this analysis of court authority, it is reasonable to infer that a lawyer 
is indeed an officer of the court, and that this office carries meaningful duties 
in the administration of justice.  Courts have the power to confer or rescind the 
office of lawyer, and to enforce the lawyer’s obedience.  In a sense, the Court 
constitutes the lawyer, creating a person’s identity as a lawyer subject to its 
power. 
C. Structural Analysis 
 Even if neither legal history nor common law were to identify lawyers as 
the court’s officers, one could determine whether they were in effect, by 
comparing what it means to be an officer with the lawyer’s relationship to the 
court.  An apposite definition of “officer” is: “an appointed or elected 
functionary in the administration of local government, a public corporation, 
institution, etc., and in early use esp[ecially] in the administration of law or 
justice.”41  By definition from the Oxford English Dictionary (which itself 
offers a historical record, tracing and archiving the etymology of the language) 
it is appropriate to refer to an appointed functionary in the administration of 
law or justice as an “officer.”  The same source defines “court” as an assembly 
in which justice is administered.42  The judge clearly falls within these 
definitions: he is an appointed (or elected) functionary in the administration of 
justice in a court—the highest officer of his court.43 
 
 40. See, e.g., About Us, ST. BAR OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/AboutUs.aspx 
(“All State Bar members are officers of the court.”) (last visited May 20, 2012); Officer of the 
Court, NORTH CAROLINA CT. SYS., http://testweb.nccourts.org/Courts/CRS/Councils/Professiona 
lism/Officer.asp (last visited May 20, 2012).  In Indiana a lawyer who has been suspended may 
be reinstated when, inter alia, she “can safely be recommended . . . to aid in the administration of 
justice as a member of the bar and an officer of the Courts.”  INDIANA RULES OF COURT: RULES 
FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS 23 § 4(b)(7) (2012), available 
at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/ad_dis/index.html. 
 41. Oxford English Dictionary Online, officer, n., 1.b (Draft Revision, Dec. 2008).  This 
source is cited for linguistic evidence of social or discursive structures—of the valences among 
terms that describe aspects of these structures. 
 42. Oxford English Dictionary Online, court, n., IV.11.a (2d ed. 1989) (“An assembly of 
judges or other persons legally appointed and acting as a tribunal to hear and determine any 
cause, civil, ecclesiastical, military, or naval.  Justice was in early times administered in 
assemblies held by the sovereign personally . . . then by judges who followed the king as officers 
of his court . . . .”). 
 43. Id.; see also Oxford English Dictionary Online, judge, n., 1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“A public 
officer appointed to administer the law; one who has authority to hear and try causes in a court of 
justice.”); Oxford English Dictionary Online, judicature, n., 1 (2d ed. 1989) (“The action of 
judging; administration of justice by duly constituted courts; judicial process.  Often in phr[ase: 
‘]court of judicature.[‘]”). 
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 A person who wishes to become a lawyer44 must apply to the bar45 for a 
license to practice law.  Typically, she applies to the highest court in the state 
for admission to the legal profession.  The court will consent only if the 
applicant meets its criteria for legal competence and the moral character 
necessary to the profession.46  The criterion of legal competence is usually met 
with educational credentials and a passing score on an examination of legal 
knowledge and analysis administered by the bar.47  Criteria relating to moral 
character48 are typically met by an investigation of the applicant’s background 
and an examination on the rules of professional conduct.49  Though the court 
 
 44. Oxford English Dictionary Online, lawyer, n., 1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“a member of the legal 
profession”). 
 45. “Bar” means “court.”  Oxford English Dictionary Online, bar, n., III.22.a (2d ed. 1989) 
(“The barrier or wooden rail marking off the immediate precinct of the judge’s seat, at which 
prisoners are stationed for arraignment, trial, or sentence.”); see also III.23.a (“This barrier, as the 
place at which all the business of the court was transacted, soon became synonymous with: Court 
. . . .”). 
 46. See, e.g., RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR OF MARYLAND (2009), available 
at http://www.courts.state.md.us/ble/pdfs/baradmissionrules.pdf; RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE 
BAR – MINNESOTA 5 (2011), available at https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/court_rules/rule. 
php?type=pr&subtype=admi&id=5; FLORIDA RULES OF THE SUPREME COURT RELATING TO 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR 1-14.2 (2011), available at http://www.floridabarexam.org/public/ 
main.nsf/rules.html; Overview, COLORADO SUP. CT., BOARD OF L. EXAMINERS, http://www.col 
oradosupremecourt.com/BLE/ble_home.htm (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 47. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N, 
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1–13 (2012), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/2012_comp_ 
guide_for_web.authcheckdam.pdf; Description and Grading of the California Bar Examination, 
ST. B. OF CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE OF B. EXAMINERS/OFF. OF ADMISSIONS, http://admis 
sions.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=wriqbATHUwY%3D&tabid=270 (last visited May 
20, 2012); Admission Requirements, ST. B. OF NEVADA, http://www.nvbar.org/content/admis 
sion-requirements (last visited May 20, 2012); Washington Bar Exam Information and 
Application, WASHINGTON ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.wsba.org/Licensing-and-Lawyer-Conduct/ 
Admissions/Bar-Exam-Admissions/Application-and-Exam-Information (last visited May 20, 
2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Statement on Moral Character Requirement for Admission to Practice Law in 
California, ST. B. OF CALIFORNIA, http://admissions.calbar.ca.gov/MoralCharacter/State 
ment.aspx (last visited May 20, 2012); Kathryn L. Allen & Jerome Braun, Admission to the Bar—
Character and Fitness Considerations, OFF. OF B. ADMISSIONS FOR THE ST. OF GEORGIA, 
http://www.gabaradmissions.org/pages/braun.php (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 49. See, e.g., State Board of Law Examiners, MARYLAND JUDICIARY, http://www.courts. 
state.md.us/ble/index.html (last visited May 20, 2012); The State Bar of California: What Does It 
Do? How Does It Work?, ST. B. OF CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/LinkClick.aspx?file 
ticket=SQpY73pa3F4%3D&tabid=212 (last visited May 20, 2012); Overview, NEW YORK ST. 
SUP. CT., COMMITTEE ON CHARACTER & FITNESS, http://www.nycourts.gov/courts/ad1/Com 
mittees&Programs/CFC/index.shtml (last visited May 20, 2012); What Are the Responsibilities of 
the Character and Fitness Committee?, ST. OF VERMONT JUDICIARY, http://www.vermontjudi 
ciary.org/Lists/l-FAQs/DispForm.aspx?ID=289 (last visited May 20, 2012). 
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may rely on a dedicated institution for processing applications,50 the court 
itself retains the authority to determine whether to appoint the applicant to an 
office of the court.51  If the court decides to admit the applicant, the court binds 
the applicant to itself with her oath, for example, to support the Constitution of 
the United States and that of the court’s state, and to “serve, protect, foster and 
promote the fair and impartial administration of justice.”52  Were the court to 
decline to take this action, the applicant would not become a lawyer.  Only 
through the consent of the state is a lawyer born. 
 Rhetorically, the metaphor of birth for the transformation of a layperson 
into a professional evokes an image of the appearance of a distinct being.  This 
metaphor does more than simply offer an image: it focuses our attention on the 
physical and symbolic processes that create a lawyer where before there was 
none.  The Socratic method of pedagogy entails “assisting a person to become 
fully conscious of ideas previously latent in the mind.”53  Similarly, the 
appearance of this distinct being is achieved through an analogous Socratic 
process in which something latent is realized, or becomes real.  The Socratic 
process is assisted: it requires someone to act as a midwife, or have a 
“maieutic” function.54 
 
 50. For example, the “State Bar of California is an administrative arm of the California 
Supreme Court[,]” which deals directly with bar admissions on behalf of the court.  ST. B. OF 
CALIFORNIA, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/ (last visited May 20, 2012); see also The State Bar of 
California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49; About the Bar, VIRGINIA ST. 
B.: AN AGENCY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA, http://www.vsb.org/site/about (last 
visited May 20, 2012); About the WSBA: Governance, WASHINGTON ST. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.wsba.org/About-WSBA/Governance (last visited May 20, 2012) (“The WSBA is an 
administrative arm of the Washington State Supreme Court.”). 
 51. See, e.g., State Board of Law Examiners, supra note 49; About Us, supra note 40 (“All 
State Bar members are officers of the court.”); INDIANA RULES OF COURT: RULES FOR 
ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND THE DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS 3 § 1 (2012), available at 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/rules/ad_dis/index.html. 
 52. NJCOP [New Jersey Commission on Professionalism] Principles and Pledge[:] The 
Lawyer’s Pledge, NEW JERSEY ST. B. ASS’N, http://www.njsba.com/resources/njcop/njcop-
principle-prof.html (last visited May 20, 2012); see also George H. Hathaway, Plain Language[:] 
A Plain English Lawyer’s Oath, ST. B. OF MICHIGAN, http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/plain 
english/columns/142.cfm (last visited May 20, 2012); Arkansas Supreme Court, Oath (“I will 
endeavor always to advance the cause of justice . . . .”) (available from the Clerk of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals (on file with the author)); ALASKA BAR RULES 5 § 3 
(2012), available at http://www.courts.alaska.gov/bar.htm (affirmation to “strive to improve both 
the law and the administration of justice.”).  See generally Carol Rice Andrews, The Lawyer’s 
Oath: Both Ancient and Modern, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3 (2009). 
 53. Oxford English Dictionary Online, maieutic, adj. and n., A.adj. (Draft Revision Sept. 
2008) (“Relating to or designating the Socratic process, or other similar method, of assisting a 
person to become fully conscious of ideas previously latent in the mind.”). 
 54. Id. 
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 The metaphor of birth also engages Hegel’s description of dialectical 
reasoning.  For Hegel, the dialectical process of syllogism mediates and unifies 
extremes or opposites to produce a higher-order truth; further, latent within 
these opposites is their unity.55  Describing Hegel’s concept of truth-production 
through unification in Fichte’s terms,56 in this dialectical process a thesis and 
its antithesis are merged into a higher truth, or synthesis.  To adapt these terms 
to the creation of a lawyer, I first propose a softer dialectic relationship that 
relaxes the requirement of opposition: this relationship exists between 
complements that need not be opposites.  The dialectical unification of these 
complements produces a synthesis that is a new entity, which may (but need 
not) be regarded as a “truth.”  The production of the new entity (such as a 
lawyer), or (professional) identity, can involve a maieutic function, either 
actually or figuratively.  The maieutic function can consist of the acts of a 
person (such as a judge) or institution (such as a court) that assist in the 
realization or materialization of something (such as an applicant to the bar) in a 
new form. 
 I refer to the creation of the lawyer as her materialization as a professional: 
of course, she existed as a person before her transformation into a member of 
the legal profession, but she did not exist as a lawyer, or in the form of a 
lawyer, with all of a lawyer’s abilities and responsibilities.  Pertinently, as a 
layperson she could not advocate for or represent others in litigation—she did 
not materialize as a lawyer in court.  I use “materialization” to refer to the 
process of her mattering57—or bodying forth—as a lawyer. 
 If the result of this birth is a lawyer, the moment of birth is that of taking 
the lawyer’s oath.  The moment of swearing the oath is transformative: the 
layperson undertakes to manifest the law through her own actions, at once 
becoming a lawyer and in turn dedicating herself to the maieutic work of 
making the rule of law a reality.  In and through performing this act she 
becomes a lawyer: the Constitution constitutes her as its servant.  She is knit 
and bound by it, as she was not a moment before.  The performative act of 
swearing the oath of the legal profession is a speech act that produces the 
lawyer as an officer of the court.  The judge giving the oath of this office is 
engaged in a maieutic process that bodies the lawyer forth as the court’s 
officer. 
 
 55. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC 588–90 (George di 
Giovanni ed. and trans., 2010). 
 56. JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE, Review of Aenesidemus, in FICHTE, EARLY PHILOSOPHICAL 
WRITINGS (D. Breazeale ed. and trans., 1988). 
 57. Judith Butler usefully defines “matter” as to “materialize, and to mean,” in discussing 
intelligibility.  JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 32 (1993).  I borrow these terms for my 
analysis of the transformation of something that does not appear or read properly in our judicial 
processes, into something that does. 
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 Before her birth into the legal profession, the applicant prepared and was 
prepared for it through a process comprising her legal education in substance, 
analysis and ethics, her moral character assessment, and her passing a bar 
examination.  Through these interactions the legal profession interpellates58 
her, or calls her, to be a lawyer, conceiving of her as a potential lawyer.  I use 
“interpellation” to point to the way in which a person or an institution can call 
something forth, giving rise to or engendering it through rhetorical and other 
acts which signal that the interpellated subject would be recognized or legible 
in the discourse59 (here, in the legal profession).  When the subject responds to 
interpellation with acts that are appropriate to the discursive realm of the 
interpellation, her responses manifest, or matter in that realm.  Meanwhile, acts 
that are inappropriate to the discursive realm fail to materialize in it: they do 
not matter; they are meaningless.  Behaviors that negate the interpellation may 
be legible in the discourse: they may matter in a negative sense, and in return 
they interpellate discouragement or sanction from the structure that attempts to 
call the subject forth.  The process of interpellation that prepares one to 
materialize as a lawyer is a process of socialization into the legal profession. 
 Interpellation is an act of subject-formation in that it conceives of a 
subject, calling or inviting the subject to form.  Maieusis is an act of subject-
formation in that it denotes the actual appearance of the subject in a discursive 
realm, the realization of the latent hope of interpellation.  The discursive realm 
of the legal profession, and the laity that is its supplement, can be understood 
to be in a dialectical relationship that synthesizes the lawyer.  The mechanisms 
of this production include the invitation (the question of identity) that 
interpellates the lawyer from the laity, the swearing of the oath (the answer) 
that unites the layperson and the discursive realm, and the swearing judge’s 
maieutic work that transforms the applicant into a lawyer, moving her into the 
discursive realm of the law, making her a real legal actor.  This dialectical 
mechanism works properly to form a lawyer when it conforms to the ethics of 
the legal discourse; that is, discursive ethics attend interpellation and maieusis, 
subject-formation and performance. 
  
 
 58. LOUIS ALTHUSSER, Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, in LENIN AND 
PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 85, 117–20 (Ben Brewster trans., 1971).  Althusser used this 
term to discuss ideology and the formation of a subject.  I find this term useful for examining the 
general problem of the creation of an identity within a discursive structure. 
 59. Deborah M. Hussey Freeland, Maieusis Through a Gated Membrane: “Getting the 
Science Right” in Public Decisionmaking, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 373, 386–87 (2007). 
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 Thus, a person can only materialize as a lawyer if a court appoints60 her to 
the bar as a functionary61 in the administration of law or justice.62  The court’s 
elaborate provisions for a person’s application and potential admission to 
practice demonstrate that the court views those whom they appoint to the legal 
profession—lawyers—as officers of the court, sworn to the administration of 
justice from the moment of their formation. 
 The presence of the lawyer is therefore a materialization of the court’s 
power.  The lawyer is a subject of the court’s power to form its officers, which 
begins with the court’s acts of admission.  The lawyer is also subject to this 
power, which subtends the officer persistently through the term of her service 
(this term may extend throughout her life, but only while it is afforded by the 
court).  The court has various means of directing its officers’ professional 
conduct.  When a lawyer appears in court as an advocate, the lawyer’s conduct 
is subject to rules (such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal or state 
rules of court, local rules, and the standing orders of the presiding judge), 
regulations to which the lawyer’s performance must conform.  The rules shape 
her demeanor and dress—her actions and costume on the court stage.  Though 
her speech may be her own improvisation, her privilege to speak is constrained 
by the responsibilities to the court that she assumes in order to appear and act 
on stage.  The lawyer may incur the court’s contempt.  Where the law and rules 
do not explicitly address a court’s need to regulate its officers’ conduct, the 
court has inherent powers to sanction and otherwise rein that conduct. 
 The court not only makes its officers, but also disciplines them.  To 
discipline is to “train to habits of order and subordination.”63  The court 
(optionally through its bar association) may require every officer to keep her 
legal education current through documented, accredited, substantive study.64  
The court may provide a hotline to assist its officers who are uncertain as to 
what would be the most ethically appropriate course of action in a given 
situation.65  If a lawyer’s performance is compromised by psychological or 
 
 60. Admission is synonymous with appointment.  Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
admission, 2 (2d ed. 1989) (“Reception or acceptance into an office or position; appointment, 
institution.”). 
 61. Oxford English Dictionary Online, functionary, n. (2d ed. 1989) (“One invested with a 
function; one who has certain functions or duties to perform; an official.”). 
 62. The administration of justice is a function of the court.  See supra note 42 and 
accompanying text. 
 63. Oxford English Dictionary Online, discipline, v., 1.a. (2d ed. 1989). 
 64. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 47, at 
45–46; The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49; 
WISCONSIN SUPREME COURT RULES 31(2011), available at http://www.wicourts.gov/sc/scrule/ 
DisplayDocument.html?content=html&seqNo=36666. 
 65. See, e.g., The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 
49; Grievance and Ethics Information, ST. B. OF TEXAS, http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template. 
cfm?Section=Grievance_Info_and_Ethics_Helpline&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&Conte
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other problems, the court may offer confidential, rehabilitative support.66  The 
court acts to assure that its officers’ conduct conforms to the professional 
ethics described in legal education, in the rules of courts and bar associations at 
all levels, and in the bar’s moral character requirements.  In a sense the court is 
always calling forth and forming its officers. 
 Discipline “form[s]” its subject “to proper conduct and action.”67  The 
legal profession serves the essential public function of upholding the rule of 
law, and public trust has afforded the profession some privileges of self-
regulation.68  The court may invite and analyze complaints from the public, 
attempt to reshape troubled attorney-client relationships, and temporarily 
inactivate or even permanently remove lawyers from office if the court deems 
that action appropriate after reviewing the lawyer’s conduct.69  Officers of the 
court also socialize themselves qua officers, for example, through the activities 
of the American Bar Association and other voluntary professional 
associations.70 
 
ntID=15697 (last visited May 20, 2012); The Utah State Bar’s Office of Professional Conduct’s 
(“OPC”) Ethics Hotline for Attorneys, OFF. OF PROF. CONDUCT, UTAH ST. B., http://www.utah 
bar.org/opc/opc_ethics_hotline.html (last visited May 20, 2012); Answering Your Questions 
About Legal Ethics, VIRGINIA ST. B., http://www.vsb.org/profguides/FAQ_leos/LegalEthics 
FAQs.html (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 66. See, e.g., The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 
49; Guide to the Colorado Attorney Assistance Program (CAAP), COLORADO SUP. CT., 
http://www.coloradosupremecourt.com/Registration/CAAP.htm (last visited May 20, 2012); 
Betty M. Shaw, Psychological Fitness: Dealing with Mental Health Issues, MINNESOTA LAW. 
PROF. RESP. BOARD, http://lprb.mncourts.gov/articles/Articles/Psychological%20Fitness-%20 
Dealing%20With%20Mental%20Health%20Issues.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012); History and 
Purpose of NHLAP, NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW. ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, http://www.lapnh.org/his 
tory.html (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 67. Oxford English Dictionary Online, discipline, n., 3.a (2d ed. 1989).  Like legal 
education, professional discipline is part of the process of socialization and identity formation of 
a lawyer.  See Oxford English Dictionary Online, socialize, v., 2 (Draft Revision Jun. 2010) (“to 
instil in (a person) the values and norms of his or her society or group.”). 
 68. Geoffrey Hazard analyzes lawyers’ diminishing self-regulation and increasing regulation 
by the courts in Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239 (1991).  
Viewing lawyers as the court’s officers suggests that the court’s regulation of lawyers should be 
regarded as a form of self-regulation.  Nonetheless, the legalization of professional norms 
transforms questions of professionalism that had been addressed informally among lawyers into 
more generic questions of legal liability. 
 69. The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49 
(noting that The State Bar of California has a dedicated State Bar Court for disciplinary hearings); 
Attorney Discipline System, NEW HAMPSHIRE JUD. BRANCH, http://www.courts.state.nh.us/com 
mittees/attydiscip/index.htm (last visited May 20, 2012); Missouri’s Lawyer Discipline System, 
MISSOURI B., http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/Legal_Resources/Bro 
chures_and_Booklets/Client_Resource_Guide/discipline.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 70. For evidence of peer socialization, see, e.g., Association Goals, AM. B. ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba/association_goals.html (last visited May 20, 
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 This analysis of the lawyer’s relationship to the court indicates that lawyers 
are de facto officers of the court.  The court creates and shapes lawyers; 
lawyers are always already creatures of the court. 
II.  WHY DO LAWYERS HAPPEN? 
 We have seen how the court71 invites a layperson to apply to the legal 
profession, how an applicant is appointed to assist the court in its 
administration of justice, and how an applicant becomes an officer of the court 
by swearing the lawyer’s oath.  In other words, the court interpellates the 
lawyer, calling forth the formation of that subject, and a layperson learns to 
respond in the terms of the legal discourse.  This question and answer, or thesis 
and antithesis, are synthesized in the maieutic moment of the judge’s 
administering and the applicant’s taking the lawyer’s oath of office: a lawyer is 
born. 
 This Part moves from the lawyer’s structural situation—the embeddedness 
of her professional identity in the legal system—to the examination of her 
function in that system. 
A. Why Does the Court Create Lawyers? 
 What does it mean for a private person to materialize as a lawyer?  To 
come into the world of law is to cross a threshold into a realm that is distinct 
from the ordinary world of the private citizen.  Law can be thought of as an 
institution or a discursive realm defined—shaped and bounded—by legal 
standards, rules, ethics, and norms within which actions proper to the law 
materialize.  “Professional” actions are those appropriate to the discursive 
realm.  The professional acts of the lawyer enact the discourse, in a sense 
forming it, presenting and re-presenting it as a stage-actor performs a play: the 
text of the play comes to life through her actions before the audience.  The 
lawyer is an integral part of the discursive structure of law; the rule of law is 
realized in part through her professional performance, and not through that of 
the judge acting alone. 
 
2012); Ethics Opinions, FLORIDA B., http://www.floridabar.org/tfb/TFBETOpin.nsf/Ethics 
Index?OpenForm (last visited May 20, 2012); Ethics Committee, BOSTON B. ASS’N, 
http://www.bostonbar.org/sc/ethics/index.htm (last visited May 20, 2012); Ethics Opinions, LOS 
ANGELES COUNTY B. ASS’N, PROF. RESP. & ETHICS COMMITTEE, http://www.lacba.org/show 
page.cfm?pageid=427 (last visited May 20, 2012). 
 71. “The court” may be used generally to refer to the judicial system, or in any specific 
instance, to refer to a particular court that performs this function.  It is occasionally debated 
whether a lawyer is an officer of the court or is instead an officer of the legal system.  A lawyer is 
both an officer of the specific court(s) before which she is admitted to practice, and an officer of 
the judicial system of which the court is a part (and clearly, the judicial system is part of the legal 
system more generally). 
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 The discursive realm of the court is one in which only certain kinds of 
statements can be made, only at particular times, only in specific ways, and 
only by particular people acting in given capacities.  This discursive realm is 
not as fully scripted as that of a play on a stage, yet the comparison is useful.  
The judge directs the action, the advocating lawyers (those who lend their 
voices) are the actors cast in speaking roles, and the parties are the characters 
(those whom the lawyers represent); the script has some passages explicitly set 
by law, while others are improvisations that must meet criteria known to the 
actors and director.  The parties and the fact-finders in some respects map into 
a critical audience, although as in some plays, they may be called upon to 
express themselves directly within given constraints. 
 As in the theatre, the script defines various boundaries within which the 
action will take place.  The court’s script is more an elaborate set of stage 
directions than a text to be spoken; as an officer of the court, the lawyer has 
both procedural and substantive responsibilities in her role as a professional 
actor on the court stage.  Through her performance, the script comes alive: 
without her action, law would remain abstract, rules in books, unrealized, 
unlived, immaterial. 
 When this professional legal actor acts as an advocate in court, she plays a 
dual role: as a professional, she always acts according to the law, rules, ethics 
and norms that define legal discourse; meanwhile, within those bounds, she 
manifests the legal interests of the party whom she represents.  The characters’ 
substantive speeches are planned and rehearsed but ultimately improvised by 
the actors, who resemble more the classical soloists of old and jazz musicians 
of today than they do actors reciting Shakespeare word for word.  While the 
lawyer has room to exercise her professional judgment to decide what to say 
on behalf of her client as she presents his claim to the judge (and how to say 
it), “professional” means that she performs these representative actions always 
within the constraints set by her role as the court’s officer.  To assist the court 
in the administration of justice, she must be honest with the judge and not 
mislead him in reporting facts to the court and rehearsing legal arguments 
about the facts for the court.  The court requires her to manifest the rules of 
procedure, evidence, lawyering, and substantive law in good faith, and not to 
manipulate them to benefit her client at the expense of the integrity of the law: 
she must play fair, and not demean her profession. 
 Though they may seem abstract, a lawyer can detect boundaries 
encompassing the court and the legal profession in her ordinary experience.  
She acknowledges these boundaries, implicitly or consciously, when she uses 
her legal skills and status ethically (rather than arbitrarily), and when she 
speaks professionally (rather than casually).  For example, she respects the 
boundary when she would like to recount a privileged story about a client—but 
instead says something else, and when she senses an opportunity to prevail as 
an advocate by asserting something in bad faith—but then does not.  If in 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] WHAT IS A LAWYER? 445 
either instance, she proceeds when she should refrain, (it is to be hoped that) 
she senses her transgression of the boundary. 
 Behavior falling within these boundaries ties into the warp-lines that 
support and subtend the legal profession.  The mesh of our laws supports our 
social fabric entire; from the courts emanate fine threads of law to mend 
specific flaws.  To realize individual rights and to fashion legal remedies, the 
officers of courts follow layers of procedural rules, within which their actions 
are fully enmeshed. 
 A judge and his court are so closely identified that “court” has become his 
metonym.  A private person who happens also to be a judge is of course a 
human being and a citizen like any other—but in his office he is also, both 
symbolically and effectively, something else as well: an instance of the state, 
appointed to administer the law in each case brought for trial in a court of 
justice.  The court is both the judge’s court and the state’s court: both the 
professional domain of the judge and an institution of government.  As a 
person vested with the state’s authority, the judge serves the state by bodying 
forth the rule of law. 
 Thus, the presiding judge has a maieutic function: in writing his opinion 
the judge treats the opposed parties, resolving their dispute by incorporating 
their theses in synthesizing a new stretch of common law.  This synthesis is 
bound by a maieutic ethic: the judge is to bracket his personal, political 
commitments and strive professionally to find, channel, or produce the law in 
accordance with the procedural and substantive rules that shape legal 
discourse.  In the formalist limit, the same law would result from the judge’s 
act of dialectical synthesis regardless of the personal identity of the writing 
judge.  While this limit may describe a professional ideal, legal realists note 
that different judges may synthesize different threads of law—despite striving 
to work properly the decisionmaking mechanisms appropriate to the discourse.  
It is the judge’s strife that manifests his professionalism, his performance of a 
speech act (writing his opinion) in accordance with the maieutic ethic of 
representation, of re-presenting the law on the matter in his hands. 
 The state channels formidable power to the court to fulfill its charge of 
applying the law and ruling justly.  The court, in turn, appoints lawyers to 
represent parties (inter alia): to manifest properly private persons whose 
interests are to appear for judgment.  The lawyer’s acts of representation are 
examined more closely below.  Clearly, lawyers are subject to the judge’s 
explicit and inherent powers and are thus lower officers of the court than is the 
judge.  If a judge is the heart and mind of the court, then the lawyers who bring 
the parties before him are its right and left hands. 
 The courts are faculties of the state that reach out in the form of their 
lawyers to engage with and act upon individuals who seek remedies.  The 
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duties that attend the lawyer’s office72 include actions that constitute the state’s 
engagement with individual petitioners who would move the court.  These 
duties are essential to the American adversarial system of justice.  Even if the 
history and design of our judicial system were not already to require the lawyer 
to act as an officer of the court, we would need to appoint the lawyer as such to 
provide and delimit the actions that manifest her clients in the system.  Indeed, 
when a lawyer who has not been admitted to practice before a foreign state 
court seeks to represent a party before that court, she will only be admitted for 
a particular performance of representation, subject to the pro hac vice rules of 
the foreign court: 
[O]ne of the principal purposes of the pro hac vice rules is to assure that, if a 
[state court’s] lawyer is not to be present . . . the lawyer admitted pro hac vice 
will be there.  As such, he is an officer of [that state’s] Court, subject to control 
of the Court to ensure the integrity of the proceeding.73 
Here again, we see that the lawyer is not only an officer of the court, but that 
the officer is subject to the court’s power for the purpose of ensuring the 
integrity of the litigation process.  As a legal actor, the lawyer has both 
procedural and substantive duties in the administration of justice, and is bound 
to play fair.  A properly socialized, disciplined lawyer can detect the ethical 
boundaries of her profession, and identifying with the discourse, has 
internalized its professional boundaries as her own. 
 Even if the lawyer’s role as an officer of the court were not well 
established in the history of our profession, it would be straightforward to infer 
it from both her structural situation and the functions she serves within the 
institutions that call the lawyer forth and shape her behavior.  Further, if the 
lawyer’s role as an officer of the court were not to exist, the court would need 
to create it to assist the judge in the adversarial process of justice that we use to 
reweave the rifts in our social order. 
B. Weaving the Social Fabric 
 While in the United States federal legal system the legislature writes the 
laws to which all persons within the state’s power are subject, the courts 
interpret and apply the laws to specific persons’ matters.  In fashioning 
 
 72. Oxford English Dictionary Online, duty, n., 1.a (2d ed. 1989) (“The action and conduct 
due to a superior . . . .”); Oxford English Dictionary Online, office, n., 2.a (“A position or post to 
which certain duties are attached, esp[ecially] one of a more or less public character; a position of 
trust, authority, or service under constituted authority; a post in the administration of government, 
the public service, the direction of a corporation, company, society, etc.”).  These duties attach the 
lawyer through the oath sworn by each applicant as she crosses the threshold of the profession of 
law, as discussed supra Part I.C. 
 73. Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 56 (Del. 1994) 
(emphasis added). 
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individual remedies from general laws, the court to some extent also makes 
law.  In drawing the threads of the law spun by the legislature to determine 
how they bind particular people, the court often must spin a few threads of its 
own. 
 The legislative machine weaves the social fabric on a grand scale, through 
the collaboration of lawmakers who represent the collective public (and who 
are lobbied by representatives from specific groups).  The legislators who work 
the mechanisms of the legislative machine are themselves the products of 
maieutic processes.  A political candidate becomes a legislator through a series 
of call and response, invitation and acceptance: the candidate is called to run 
by a vacancy in the institutional structure of the legislature, and his running in 
turn interpellates voters; their election in turn invites him to office, to which 
his taking the oath of office is an answer—in that maieutic moment, a 
legislator is born.  The legislator’s constituents constitute him as their 
representative in government: he is their reification, their manifestation as an 
actor in a legislative discourse; they are the material of which he (as a 
legislator) consists.  His election not only renders him the site of reified 
members of the public, but it also makes him a public servant as a member of 
the government.  Thus, the professional acts of a Senator or Congressman are 
governmental actions, as well as actions on behalf of his public constituents 
who cannot otherwise reach the mechanisms of the legislative realm. 
 Legislators who are the products of election processes in turn complement 
each other as they produce statutory law.  While the laws they synthesize on 
our behalf bind each of us, by necessity they are writ large: its scope 
encompassing the political will of large numbers to govern the work of large 
numbers, the statute is coarse cloth.  A legislator performs at least two orders 
of maieutic acts.  The first involves representing or channeling his 
constituents’ interests as he negotiates and drafts legislation, translating his 
most honest understanding of their needs and will into a text that is appropriate 
for transformation into the language of a statute.  The second is his vote, the 
speech act that transforms a bill into law, enacting it as a statute—a text that 
will in turn be read to inform social ordering, and be interpreted in the maieutic 
work of a judge. 
 I see in Hegel’s discussion of the syllogistic process a crochet that traces a 
chain of syntheses involving various kinds of syllogism (for example, the 
syllogism of existence, the syllogisms of reflection, and the syllogism of 
necessity) in which “[t]he different genera of the syllogism exhibit instead the 
stages in the repletion or concretion”74 of their mediating terms.  That is, each 
“syllogism is full of content,”75 and at the maieutic moment at which a new 
 
 74. HEGEL, supra note 55, at 624 (italics omitted). 
 75. Id. at 617 (italics omitted). 
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thread is pulled through a dialectical loop (“the completion of the syllogism”76) 
the mediation sublates itself: the posited mediation has been realized or 
concretized—the interpellation has been answered through a maieutic act that 
posits a new site of interpellation.  In the discourse of the law, this weaving, 
this “movement is the sublation of this mediation”77 into the next order of 
mediation that produces the fabric of social order.  For example, an extant 
government interpellates a new legislator from the general public through its 
established mechanisms of election; the process of election culminates in the 
maieutic moment in which a member of the public takes the oath of office, 
crossing into the realm of the government, creating a new extant government 
and reifying his constituents therein, a unification that sublates an electorate 
into one representative.  This newly produced government actor then 
participates in a different genre of production, that of synthesizing new law 
from potential manifestations in the legislative process.  This legislative 
production process culminates in the maieutic moment of the enactment of a 
new statute, a new hard-twisted thread in the statute-cloth. 
 Working within these warp and weft, the court must interlace fine 
filaments of legal discourse to weave out the social fabric.  In that they work at 
the level of the individual, individual courts more resemble cottages of 
industry than factories—though collectively, their structure entails review of 
the filaments they produce for uniformity with parallel filaments, and for 
conformity to the pattern delineated in the Constitution and by the legislature.  
In these cottages the sublime rule of law materializes.  Thus, the court is the 
law’s best room: it is sacred to the rule of law, and one enters the court at the 
utmost of care.  The bar—the demarcation that distinguishes this realm of legal 
industry is so crucial to the function of the legal profession that it has become 
synecdochic for the court; the boundary between the court and that which is 
not properly before it is of central importance in the administration of justice.  
“The bar” meant literally “the railing or ‘bar’ in a courtroom [that] separat[es] 
spectators from lawyers and the judge.”78  This boundary between the court 
and the laity protects the integrity of the court.  Accordingly, petitions to mend 
gaps or rents in the social fabric must be brought properly (as specified by 
layers of rules of procedure) for the mechanisms of the court to act upon them. 
 Put another way, the best room houses the machinery that spins out the 
rule of law; accordingly, it must be kept free of inappropriate matter that would 
gum up the mechanisms, of inappropriate actions that would derange the 
delicate instruments of social order.  The boundary that encompasses the court 
must be selectively permeable: it must allow in only information and action 
that are appropriate to the court, and keep out that which would misguide it.  
 
 76. Id. at 623. 
 77. Id. at 624. 
 78. The State Bar of California: What Does It Do? How Does It Work?, supra note 49. 
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The gatekeepers at this boundary between the court and those who seek legal 
action are the lawyers.  Thus, the lawyers are professionally bound to bring 
before the court only those parties whose claims are legally and ethically 
appropriate for judicial action, and to present those claims only in ways that 
make them fit for entry into the best room.  To the extent that the gatekeeping 
lawyer fails in these functions, the integrity of the court is imperiled: the rule 
of law remains immaterial, as it does not materialize in the work of the court. 
 The judge at the court’s center issues his officers to meet those who would 
appear before him.  These officers are produced by the court to work at its 
boundary, to engage those who seek remedies and help them materialize 
properly before the court as parties to a legal action.  Through these liminal 
figures, individuals who seek rights are realized by the state; like heroes at a 
frontier, lawyers encounter someone who has unrealized rights and brings them 
into the material, performing boundary-work between public and private, law 
and non-law.  In the structure of the court, the lawyers are the bar—protecting 
the integrity of the court’s decisions by ensuring that they are properly 
founded, and thus protecting the integrity of the common law.  These officers 
are bound to maintain the court’s integrity in both specified and general 
ways.79  Necessarily responsible to the indispensable, foundational, and thus 
primary functions of the court of justice, lawyers owe a duty to the court to 
represent before it a private person as a party, translating the former into the 
latter.  A translator assisting a witness in testifying before the court must take 
“an oath or affirmation to make a true translation.”80  This legal requirement 
signals and supports the fact-finder’s epistemological reliance on the witness’ 
testimony, which is itself made under duty and oath to testify truthfully.81  A 
fortiori, the lawyer who represents or translates private concerns into public 
pleadings acts under duty and oath to make a true translation: to represent the 
party honestly without misleading the finder of fact.82  A lawyer whose 
 
 79. For example, lawyers must maintain the integrity of the profession, MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L. CONDUCT PART 8 (2010), and maintain candor toward the court, id. R. 3.3. 
 80. FED. R. EVID. 604. 
 81. FED. R. EVID. 603 (“Before testifying, a witness must give an oath or affirmation to 
testify truthfully.  It must be in a form designed to impress that duty on the witness’s 
conscience.”). 
 82. This duty extends beyond simply avoiding misstatements of fact or law, to avoiding 
expediency, deceit, trickery, or artfulness.  See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West 
Supp. 2012); The Lawyer’s Oath, MISSOURI B., http://members.mobar.org/pdfs/publications/ 
annual_report/oath.pdf (last visited May 20, 2012); Lawyer[‘]s Oath, ST. B. OF MICHIGAN, 
http://www.michbar.org/generalinfo/lawyersoath.cfm (last visited May 20, 2012); SOUTH 
CAROLINA JUDICIAL DEP’T RULES 402(k)(3), Oath of Office for Attorneys (“I will employ for 
the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me only such means as are consistent with trust 
and honor and the principles of professionalism, and will never seek to mislead an opposing 
party, the judge or jury by a false statement of fact or law[.]” (emphasis added)), available at 
http://www.sccourts.org/courtReg/displayRule.cfm?ruleID=402&subRuleID=&ruleType=APP. 
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performance fails in these duties engages in mis-representation, failing in the 
very purpose for which the court created her. 
 So, the Constitution provides for the judge, the judge appoints the lawyer 
to assist him in the administration of justice, and the lawyer represents the 
party before the court.  Legal representation is a complex function that operates 
on a layperson to render him as a specific legal subject.  The lawyer performs 
this function for the court and for her client, and in doing so is engaged in 
maieutic acts: she must bracket her personal interests, both in assuring the 
integrity of the legal process and in manifesting the client’s position subject to 
it.  The officer surveys the person’s self-described situation through the lenses 
of her legal training to identify aspects that could materialize as facts under a 
law.  Using her professional judgment, the officer operates upon the 
layperson’s story, laying hands upon it, forming it into a proper disposition for 
the judge’s action.  By petitioning, the officer pleads for the party so that the 
decisionmaker, the heart and mind of the court, may dispose of the case as 
lawfully and justly as he is able.  The client would not appear properly before 
the court but for the professional maieutic work of the lawyer,83 who herself 
could not appear in court but for the operation of the court’s authority, which 
in turn flows from the Constitution.  This tracing up the stream of crocheted 
pregnant mediations finds the Constitution itself the product of a maieutic 
process: by ratifying the Constitution, the representatives of several states 
consummated the dialectical relationship in which their contradictions were 
merged, sublating the states to create a new union. 
 The lawyer’s work in representation involves translating and coding the 
client’s situation into a legally operable form, and the court’s operation 
interprets a private grievance in terms of social meaning.  The new social 
meaning has public import, regulating relationships between people (whether 
individual or organized: natural persons, corporations and states) and 
allocating responsibility for their actions.  For example, what is commonly 
known about the dispute between Roe and Wade is not the detail of the parties’ 
personal situations, but the meaning of the court’s action upon their situations 
for the rights of all American women. 
 
 83. It is possible for a person to represent himself before the court as a pro se litigant.  Re-
presentation is still expected; that is, the person is to translate his situation into matter appropriate 
for the judge to act upon, though the judge himself may try to reach out and assist him with that 
complex task.  Self-representation is deemed inadvisable, to the point where a court may require 
and appoint a lawyer to represent the would-be pro se litigant as a party if it deems the person’s 
own representation inadequate to the matter at hand.  See, e.g., Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
452 U.S. 18, 33–34 (1981) (declining to appoint counsel in a case of termination of parental 
rights, but noting that doing so may be “[a]wise public policy,” and that at the time, “33 States 
and the District of Columbia provide[d] statutorily for the appointment of counsel” in these 
cases). 
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 In sum, the lawyer assists the court in representational, translational 
boundary work, as both a gatekeeper at and a channel through a boundary that 
separates the private from the public while connecting them in procedurally 
prescribed ways.  Through her maieutic work to present a layperson’s cause, 
only particular aspects of his private concern will materialize in the public 
realm of law, and those, only in prescribed forms.  The private is shaped and 
thus limited by its manifestation in the public realm, for the benefit of the 
public’s interest in the rule of law.  The major task that the lawyer does for the 
court in representing a party is translating and transforming a private matter 
into the public realm, rendering a personal grievance into a proper subject for 
collective social action in accordance with the rule of law. 
C. Harmony or Discord 
 The translational work of the lawyer entails its own ethics, of fidelity both 
to the client’s meaning and to the integrity of the target language.  The lawyer 
must avoid substituting her personal meaning for that of the client, but also 
must use the court’s language according to its own syntax, grammar and 
semantics.  The lawyer’s act of translation engages her professional 
judgment,84 which is to work in the lacunae between the client’s matter and the 
court’s action to effect a proper representation of the private party to the 
public. 
1. The Term “Standard Conception” Was Coined To Refer to 
Professional Identity Trouble. 
 Being on the frontier between the court and the private party, the lawyer is 
a liminal figure in both realms.  She attains this marginal status in performing a 
function essential to the administration of justice, but its liminality has 
confused analysts: though her situation makes it impossible to account for her 
exclusively within only one or the other realm, many analysts attempt to locate 
her in one realm while ignoring or distorting her manifestation in the other.  
Then, the situation of the lawyer is framed as though the lawyer were only 
either a court officer or an agent of the client—and since the client pays the 
lawyer, the court-officer picture evanesces, leaving only the “standard 
conception” (a term that Gerald Postema introduced to refer to a professional 
 
 84. The exercise of professional judgment contemplated by the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct requires the lawyer to be honest with the client, and may “involve[] unpleasant facts and 
alternatives that a client may be disinclined to confront.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
2.1 cmt. 1 (2010).  As Wendel puts it, “Professionalism . . . instructs lawyers not to participate in 
the hocus-pocus of turning dogs into ducks, and is therefore a principle for regulating the exercise 
of interpretive judgment.”  W. Bradley Wendel, Professionalism as Interpretation, 99 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1167, 1171 (2005). 
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identity that, “far from encouraging the development and preservation of a 









The Standard Conception 
 The archetypal statement of a lawyer’s professional identity as the agent of 
a client is Lord Brougham’s Speech in Defence of Queen Caroline, in which he 
asserted that a lawyer knows “but one person in the world, THAT CLIENT 
AND NONE OTHER,” and that to save that client, “he must go on reckless of 
the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be, to involve his country in 
confusion for his client’s protection.”86  His client, Queen Caroline, had been 
charged with treason; to save her from being dethroned, he was threatening to 
reveal the king’s marriage to another (which disqualified the king from his 
throne).87  Brougham’s statement was not simply a disquisition on the lawyer’s 
role, but a performative speech act threatening his king on behalf of his queen 
in a situation that could devolve into a civil war—and even this extreme 
statement showed care for the opposing party and for the public, in that he did 
not simply reveal the harmful information to which he alluded.  Although the 
circumstances of this utterance that Brougham himself described as “anything 
 
 85. Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 63, 
74 (1980).  See supra Part I.B. regarding the necessary independence of the lawyer’s professional 
judgment from the identity of her employer. 
 86. Henry Lord Brougham, Speech in the Case of Queen Caroline, in 1 SPEECHES OF 
HENRY LORD BROUGHAM: UPON QUESTIONS RELATING TO PUBLIC RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND 
INTERESTS 103, 105 (1838). 
 87. Id. at 88–90.  Brougham himself identified this statement as a threat: “The real truth is, 
that the statement was anything rather than a deliberate and well-considered opinion.  It was a 
menace, and it was addressed chiefly to George IV, but also to wiser men . . . .”  Charles P. 
Curtis, The Ethics of Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3, 4 (1951) (quoting Letter from Lord Brougham 
to William Forsyth[] (1859), in ELLIOT E. CHEATHAM, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 227 (1938)).  Forsyth wrote in an annotation to the letter that Brougham 
likely agreed with the view articulated by the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in their presence, “that 
the arms which an advocate wields he ought to use as a warrior, not as an assassin.  . . . He ought 
to know how to reconcile the interests of his clients with the eternal interests of Truth and 
Justice.”  LETTERS FROM LORD BROUGHAM TO WILLIAM FORSYTH, 41 (Wm. Forsyth ed., 1872). 
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rather than a deliberate and well-considered opinion”88 were unusually 
strained, and despite its obvious ulterior meaning, Brougham’s statement has 
been taken up as a banner by those who would frame the lawyer merely as a 
client’s agent.89  This rhetorical veil over a grave substantive threat has floated 
across the sea and the centuries, touching a page now and again, its relict traces 
themselves contested90—the slipping of a thread in the social fabric. 
 A lawyer’s tunnel-visioned focus on her status as a client’s agent can allow 
her to forget that she is available to the client only as an officer of the court.  If 
her zeal for the client is not balanced by her duties to the court, she risks 
disserving the client by malfunctioning as a court officer.  Overzeal backfire is 
a genre of malpractice,91 the most aggravated symptoms of which include 
misrepresentation and the capture of legal procedures for improper purposes.92  
Some jurisdictions have been troubled by the potential for lawyers willfully to 
misinterpret “zeal” in client representation, and therefore have dropped the 
term from their professional codes.93  Even Massachusetts and the District of 
 
 88. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, “Anything Rather Than a Deliberate and Well-
Considered Opinion”—Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
1221, 1222 (2006) (quoting Letter from Lord Brougham to William Forsyth (1859), in WILLIAM 
FORSYTH, THE HISTORY OF LAWYERS ANCIENT AND MODERN 380 n.1 (1875)). 
 89. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 68, at 1244 (describing Brougham’s statement as “the 
classic vindication of the lawyer’s partisan role”); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL 
ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 7, 257 n.11 (2008). 
 90. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Henry Lord Brougham, Written by Himself, 19 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1213 (2006); Zacharias & Green, supra note 88; Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. 
Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2005) (reporting mid-
to-late-nineteenth century debates such as that noted in Rush v. Cavenaugh, 2 Pa. 187, 189 (1845) 
(“It is a popular, but gross mistake, to suppose that a lawyer owes no fidelity to any one except 
his client; and that the latter is the keeper of his professional conscience.”)); John Leubsdorf, 
Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 124 (1995) (“The 
inescapable reality is that every lawyer is at the center of a web” of relationships.). 
 91. Leubsdorf, supra note 90, at 120 (“[I]mprudent overzealousness [is] likely to backfire 
against the client.”). 
 92. Id. at 127–28 (“The main exceptions in tort law to the rule of lawyer nonliability to 
opposing litigants are intentional misrepresentation and the use of inappropriate process for an 
improper purpose.” (footnote omitted)). 
 93. See, e.g., ME. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 Reporter’s Notes (2008), available at 
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar_overseers_bar_rules&id=87826&
v=article (“The Task Force determined that the term ‘zeal’ was often used as a cover for a 
lawyer’s inappropriate behavior.  Moreover, the Task Force thought the term was not needed to 
describe a lawyer’s ethical duties.  Accordingly, the Task Force recommended its deletion.”); 
OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3, Comparison to ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct (2007) available at http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfCon 
duct/profConductRules.pdf (“Zealous advocacy is often invoked as an excuse for unprofessional 
behavior.”); Comparison of Newly Adopted Washington Rules of Professional Conduct with ABA 
Model Rules, AM. B. ASS’N (Aug. 2006), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/mi 
grated/cpr/pic/washington.pdf (“replaces ‘zealously’ with ‘conscientiously and ardently’”); 
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Columbia, which affirmatively call for a lawyer to represent a client 
“zealously,” qualify the urge for zeal with, “within the bounds of the law.”94  
Anita Bernstein calls this qualification a “prissy tag-along caution”95 though 
she nonetheless suggests that it be retained.96  Bernstein’s thesis is that a 
lawyer’s practice “is marred at least as much by a shortage as a surplus of zeal 
in advocacy on behalf of clients[.]”97  Ultimately, however, Bernstein is one of 
many commentators who see zealous advocacy as part of the lawyer’s 
professional identity—but take care to distinguish “zeal” as a favored quality 
from “zealotry” or excessive zeal, a disparagement.98  Determining how to 
make this distinction between zeal and excessive zeal requires the lawyer to 
exercise her professional judgment, and is part of the lawyer’s work in crafting 
her professional identity. 
2. Discord: The Double Bind 
 The lawyer drawing this boundary might experience her situation as a 
convergence of conflicting interests.99  She has been called forth by the court 
to serve as its officer, and thus is bound to serve in the administration of 
 
STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON PROFESSIONALISM 15 (Mar. 21, 2005), 
available at http://www.azbar.org/media/64636/professionalism%20task%20force.pdf (listing 
“zeal” as a “cause[] of unprofessional behavior”); Arthur J. Lachman & Peter R. Jarvis, Zeal in 
Client Representation - FAQs, 2005 PROF. LAW. 81, 83–84 (summarizing as of 2005, but noting 
that the District of Columbia and Massachusetts both added “zealously” to their adopted versions 
of Model Rule 1.3).  Model Rule 1.3 is titled “Diligence,” and provides that “[a] lawyer shall act 
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2010). 
 94. MASS. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
obcbbo/rpc1.htm#Rule%201.3; D.C. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007), available at 
http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/ethics/legal_ethics/rules_of_professional_conduct/amended_ru
les/rule_one/rule01_03.cfm. 
 95. Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1166 (2006). 
 96. Id. at 1189. 
 97. Id., though Bernstein also notes that, “Zealous advocacy does not comport with the 
lawyer as transportation vehicle or lunch counter, passively meeting the felt needs of a customer 
and exercising no discretion.”  Id. at 1197. 
 98. See, e.g., 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF 
LAWYERING § 6.2, at 6-4 (3d ed., Supp. 2003) (“[L]awyers have never had a special dispensation 
to aid a client’s cause through unethical or unlawful means, and Model Rule 1.3 hardly provides 
one.  To the contrary, zealous representation must be within the bounds of the law in order to pass 
muster . . . .”); Lachman & Jarvis, supra note 93, at 81 (“Nowhere in any ethical rule or 
commentary is it even suggested that ‘zealotry,’ as opposed to ‘zeal,’ is an appropriate standard of 
lawyer conduct.”). 
 99. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1988) (“The real dispute” is about how and how much lawyers “should consider attending to the 
[legal] framework’s integrity as one of their professional responsibilities.  This is obviously an 
important dispute.”). 
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justice.  She also has been retained by her client to plead on his behalf, to 
advocate for his cause (arguably, zealously), and thus is bound to protect his 
confidences and to act as his agent in representing him to the court.  As we 
have seen, this perceived conflict ostensibly may be resolved by denying a 
troubling source of obligation—ignoring the interpellations of one of her 
discursive situations so that the lawyer is left with only one identity that 
matters.  This is how the “standard conception” of the lawyer comes about. 
 When her manifestation within one of her professional realms is forgotten, 
the lawyer’s professional identity begins to dis-integrate.  To prevent this, it 
becomes all the more important to focus on the lawyer’s evanescent 
embodiment.  But even when both situations of the lawyer are acknowledged, 
there nonetheless remains the idea of a double bind that pulls the lawyer into 










 The professional identity crisis over whether a lawyer is primarily a 
zealous advocate or an officer of the court is pervasive, manifesting in other 
legal contexts as well in litigation: lawyers who hold licenses but do not appear 
in court nonetheless remain subject to the court’s regulation (and sometimes 
also to that of other administrative bodies), and legal counseling occurs with an 
awareness of the law and the potential for litigation, regulation and sanctions.  
For example, transactional lawyers are subject to rules of fairness and ethics in 
negotiation, and their transactions are subject to the securities laws.  The 
lawyer has affirmative duties to decline to sign and file with the Securities 
Exchange Commission a client corporation’s misleading public disclosures,100 
much as a litigator has affirmative duties to sign and file with the court only 
papers that are submitted for proper purposes, warranted by law and supported 
by evidence.101  Additionally, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002102 required the 
Securities Exchange Commission to issue rules that, like the various courts’ 
rules of professional conduct, articulate aspects of a minimum standard for the 
professional conduct of a lawyer practicing before the agency.  The rules were 
 
 100. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011). 
 101. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 102. 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006). 
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to require the lawyer to report “evidence of a material violation of securities 
law” by a corporate client to the client’s chief legal counsel or CEO, and if the 
officer “does not appropriately respond to the evidence[,]” then to the board of 
directors.103  In articulating the duty of a lawyer representing an issuer before 
the SEC to make these reports, the promulgated rules further establish that by 
making such a report, “an attorney does not reveal client confidences or secrets 
or privileged or otherwise protected information related to the attorney’s 
representation of an issuer,”104 and that without the client’s consent, the lawyer 
“may reveal to the Commission . . . confidential information related to the 
representation to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary” to 
prevent or rectify a client’s violation of the law under certain circumstances, or 
to prevent the client from committing or suborning perjury, or from 
“committing any act . . . that is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon the 
Commission[.]”105 
 Lawyers who counsel a client in other contexts also socialize the client to 
the legal system.  For example, in the patent context the lawyer’s duties as an 
officer of the court may require her to counsel the client against filing a patent 
application to cover an obvious “invention” (the obvious is not legally 
patentable,106 so applying for a patent on the obvious either wastes legal 
resources if the application properly fails, or diverts the patent system from its 
Constitutional goals if the application improperly succeeds).  Or, in the context 
of community lawyering, the lawyer’s duties as an officer of the court may 
require her to counsel the client to negotiate rather than to litigate—to avoid 
seeking judicial resources when Constitutional goals would be better served by 
other means.107 
 
 103. Id. 
 104. 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(1). 
 105. Id. § 205.3(d)(2). 
 106. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
 107. Bill Ong Hing, In the Interest of Racial Harmony: Revisiting the Lawyer’s Duty To Work 
for the Common Good, 47 STAN. L. REV. 901, 932 (1995) (arguing that not only community 
lawyers, but any lawyer with a case involving race relations “can counsel clients in the interest of 
racial harmony”): 
Lawyers also have heightened access to the power structure, including the power to shape 
both policy and law.  Lawyers’ ability to win legal rights for racial and ethnic minorities, 
as well as their involvement when the legal interests of these groups clash, give them the 
capability to create positive and negative effects.  Lawyers can either defuse racial and 
ethnic tension and build bridges between communities or intensify social divisions 
depending on how they handle each case.  Lawyers must be aware of this potential and 
think through the consequences of their lawyering choices as well as the choices of their 
clients. 
Id. at 931. 
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 These examples all demonstrate that the lawyer is not only an officer of the 
court when she is engaged in litigation—she is always already an officer of the 
court, and acts as such whenever she performs as a professional. 
 Though these obligations are characteristic of the lawyer’s pressing duties 
as an officer of the court, commentators who perceived that the transactional 
lawyer’s duty to report evidence indicated not only a counseling but moreover 
a gatekeeping role for the lawyer controverted the latter role: some objected to 
its interference with the lawyer’s role as a client advocate, while others viewed 
it as a matter of course for the lawyer as an officer of the court.108 
3. Harmony: The Coherence of the Lawyer’s Professional Identity 
 The lawyer is in a double bind: the officer of the court representing a client 
is enmeshed in a dual role, and may experience role strain109 if these ties 
diverge.  However, the lawyer’s dual enmeshment problem eases in light of the 
present discussion.  It is clear that the lawyer would not even be present to 
represent the client were the court not creating and maintaining her.  Thus, the 
lawyer’s original, persistent and primary duty is to the court, to function as its 
officer in the administration of justice; any other roles depend upon—hang 
upon, are subordinate to—her role as the court’s functionary.  In other words, 
the lawyer’s role as the client’s representative exists to help the court function 
in its administration of justice, so that the representative functions that the 
lawyer performs to help the client are circumscribed and subtended by her 
role as an officer of the court. 
 
 108. See, e.g., Fred Zacharias, Lawyers as Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1387, 1388-
89 nn.2-5 (2004) (collecting citations); id. at 1389 (arguing the “simple, and ultimately 
uncontroversial, point [that l]awyers are gatekeepers and always have been” (footnote omitted)); 
Wendel, supra note 84, at 1179 & n.38 (“The services of gatekeepers, such as transactional 
lawyers and auditing firms, signal to the market that the client’s representations are fair and 
accurate.”) (collecting citations); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for 
the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (2003); Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. & Eugene R. Gaetke, 
The Ethical Obligation of Transactional Lawyers To Act As Gatekeepers, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 9 
(2003). 
  Some criticism of the lawyer’s gatekeeping role is leveled at its purported conflation of 
the lawyer’s function with that of the judge.  In another context, William Simon succinctly 
articulates a distinction between the lawyer and the judge as gatekeepers.  See William H. Simon, 
Role Differentiation and Lawyers’ Ethics: A Critique of Some Academic Perspectives, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 987, 1000 (2010) (“The lawyer’s role, of course, is different from the judge’s.  
The judge’s decisions are typically dispositive; the lawyer’s are typically facilitative.”). 
  The gatekeeping role of the government lawyer similarly has been debated.  See 
Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 951 (1991) (collecting citations). 
 109. William J. Goode, A Theory of Role Strain, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 483 (1960) (The difficulty 
of fulfilling the demands of multiple roles results in the subject’s role-bargaining—reducing her 
overall role strain by allocating her efforts to perform well among all of her role relationships.  
Thus, she will perform better in some roles at the expense of others.). 
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 The lawyer both works within the court and directly engages the private 
party in a critical, interstitial realm that contacts the public and private spheres.  
In this interstice the lawyer must exercise her independent professional 
judgment110 to effect a proper translational connection between the two.111  
The Supreme Court has recognized this professional realm in which the 
lawyer’s roles converge, and explicitly relied on her functions of promoting 
justice in the court and the legal system as its basis for creating the work-
product doctrine in Hickman v. Taylor.112 
 This interstitial realm is also the “empty stage” at the core of the lawyer’s 
job as envisioned by Robert Gordon.113  The stage is empty in that the exercise 
of professional judgment is necessarily “incompletely specified, or 
underdetermined by rules and standards”114: the coarse statute cloth must be 
elaborated by the common law, and so the lawyer draws thread for the judge.  
At the edge of the law, where rules fall silent, the lawyer searches her 
professional soul for the ethics and norms of her formative socialization, and as 
she decides how to perform her job, she further forms herself as a lawyer. 
 The disharmony of the double-bind can be resolved: as the role-structure 
diagrammed in Figure 3 is realized, the lawyer’s professional identity coheres.  
 
 110. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010) (“In representing a client, a lawyer 
shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice.” (emphasis added)).  
Note also the professional judgments required by FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  See also Postema, supra 
note 85, at 68. 
 111. See William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional 
Ethics, 1978 WISC. L. REV. 29, 112 (“[T]he task for which the lawyer’s role was created in the 
first place, [is] the reconciliation of public and private ends.”). 
 112. 329 U.S. 495, 510–11 (1947): 
  Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to work for the 
advancement of justice while faithfully protecting the rightful interests of his clients.  In 
performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain 
degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.  
Proper preparation of a client’s case demands that he assemble information, sift what he 
considers to be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan 
his strategy without undue and needless interference.  That is the historical and the 
necessary way in which lawyers act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence 
to promote justice and to protect their clients’ interests. 
 113. Gordon, supra note 99, at 8. 
 114. Wendel, supra note 84, at 1195; see also Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics in Counseling, in 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr., et al., Symposium: Client Counseling and Moral Responsibility, 30 PEPP. 
L. REV. 591, 608 (2003) (footnote omitted): 
As officers of the court and gatekeepers in imperfect regulatory processes, lawyers have 
obligations that transcend those owed to any particular client.  Honesty, trust, and fairness 
are collective goods; neither legal nor market systems can function effectively if lawyers 
lack a basic sense of social responsibility for the consequences of their professional acts. 
To Simon’s observation that there is no consensus about where to draw line between the lawyer 
as advocate and as officer of the court, I respond that such a consensus would crowd the empty 
stage on which this line-drawing is part of the lawyer’s boundary work. 
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The dual roles of the lawyer as both an officer of the court and counsel render 
her a specific kind of court officer who translates between the realms of the 











Role-Coherence and Integrity of Identity for the Lawyer 
 Consider the coherence of the lawyer’s roles as she assists the court in 
weaving the social fabric: her client’s thread pulls toward his private interests.  
As he becomes wrapped up in his private concerns, his focus foregrounds his 
side of the story that will be performed for the judge; he backgrounds his 
interests in the rule of law as a member of the public, relying (implicitly or 
consciously) on the integrity of the justice system to attend to his public 
interests. 
 Part of the lawyer’s work in translating her client’s interests into claims 
before the court is to screen appropriate matter for judicial consideration from 
inappropriate matter.  The screens that the lawyer applies comprise laws, rules, 
ethics, norms and any other professional expectations that contribute to 
procedural integrity (i.e., following the procedures meticulously) and fairness 
(e.g., scrupulously avoiding mis-representation to the court, and dealing fairly 
with the other side)—Constitutional values that the lawyer has sworn to 
uphold.  Indeed, the court’s procedural integrity flows from our Constitutional 
commitment to “fair play and substantial justice,”115 so that the lawyer’s sworn 
duty to uphold the Constitution entails duties to adhere firmly to established 
judicial procedures and to conform to legal ethics as she presents the client to 
the court.116  Through the lawyer’s professional performance that conforms to 
the maieutic ethic, the client manifests as a party with justiciable claims. 
 
 115. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977); World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 
480 U.S. 102, 116 (1987). 
 116. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 2 (2010) (“This Rule sets 
forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to avoid conduct that undermines the 
integrity of the adjudicative process.”). 
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 If the lawyer uncritically lends her skillful hands and—with her feet firmly 
anchored in the court—simply pulls for her client, the social fabric will strain.  
If this is what lawyers should do, then we must multiply these strains (or 
combine them with a power law) across all of the diverging interests of clients, 
and the social fabric will tangle about arbitrary, irreconcilable lines.  Reciting 
the fact that the client pays the lawyer for her services, some imagine the 
lawyer to be primarily or exclusively an agent who is trained to work the legal 
system to obtain benefits for her private client.  But the lawyer’s fee, which is 
required by law to be reasonable,117 is properly for the lawyer to perform her 
dual role as an officer of the court representing the client professionally—the 
lawyer’s performance is to conform to the rules, ethics, morals, norms, and 
other standards that sustain the rule of law.  That the fee is not to be 
unreasonably high signals that it is not to include a bribe to throw the game in 
the client’s favor. 
 The lawyer’s commitment to the Constitution (to the rule of law) is a 
commitment to restrain and direct the exercise of arbitrary power.118  This 
commitment entails helping the judge to reconcile the client’s thread with the 
broader social fabric, harmonizing individual interests with the law of the land.  
To administer justice is to weave out gaps in the law and to mend rent fabric.  
This work looks not only to the threads at hand, but to the pattern that will 
persist beyond any particular client or matter. 
 Though the judge does the knitting, the lawyer is not free to run with a 
yarn, unraveling the court’s work.  The dispute before the judge is framed in 
terms of two opposed sides, each of whose evidence and arguments are to be 
equally well represented.  The material facts presented to the court should be 
as accurate and complete as reasonably possible, save for those submerged by 
ethically asserted privileges, which are narrowly construed precisely because 
they obscure material facts from the court’s view.  The lawyer is committed to 
ensuring that the court has what it needs to resolve the dispute fairly.  If the 
lawyer fails in this commitment, she is subject to sanction.119 
4. The Big Picture 
 Thinking through the lawyer’s structural position and functions with 
respect to the court and the legal system results in an understanding of her 
 
 117. See, e.g., Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel.Winn, 130 S. Ct. 1662 (2010); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2010). 
 118. Oxford English Dictionary Online, rule, n., 4.c (2d ed. 1989) (“rule of law: . . . (b) with 
the: a doctrine, deriving from theories of natural law, that in order to control the exercise of 
arbitrary power, the latter must be subordinated to impartial and well-defined principles of law; 
(c) with the: spec. in English law, the concept that the day-to-day exercise of executive power 
must conform to general principles as administered by the ordinary courts.”). 
 119. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g); FED. R. CIV. P. 37. 
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discursive situation (identity), and also her role-structure, that can be 











Ordering the Lawyers’ Roles 
 In her service to the court, the lawyer extends from the court to the client, 
sifting the situation presented to her for issues that are proper for treatment by 
the court, and translating those issues for expression to the court in a form that 
assists (and does not thwart) the court’s operation.  The process of legal 
representation is thus selective in those aspects of the client that will manifest 
in court, and the means and ends of their manifestation are limited, specified, 
and shaped by legal, ethical and normative requirements.  The officer of the 
court renders the party presentable to the court, and her rendition must conform 
to its requisites. 
 In her service to the client, the lawyer counsels the client as to how his 
situation maps into the law.  She may advise the client as to the legality of 
various possible courses of action, but may only assist the client in those that 
conform to the law and legal ethics.120  The court provides the lawyer’s 
privilege to represent a client before it subject to the duties discussed above; 
thus, only within the realm bounded by those layers of duty is the lawyer 
permitted to advocate for the client to the best of her professional skill.  Only 
through the lawyer’s manifestation as an officer of the court may the client’s 
manifestation as a party before the court be realized. 
 Thus, in our adversary system of justice, the lawyer’s duty to manifest 
client interests before the court is a service performed for both the court and 
the client.  Individual client interests may be represented as threads in the 
fabric; the work of social ordering under the law is to assure that their 
manifestation in it is harmonious: that the result of litigation is fair to the 
instant parties, and that it does not distort of the fabric of justice when it is 
generalized to all those similarly situated.  This work is not merely abstract, 
but is actually accomplished by professionals—keepers of the cloth—including 
 
 120. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2010). 
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lawyers who represent client interests to the court and subject them to its 
decisions.  This work does not merely preserve the law, because the law is 
dynamic: the fabric billows and ripples in social currents—but wherever its 
line is drawn, it bears the sway.  This work preserves the rule of law by 
manifesting it ever over in new ties around each new conflict, aligning private 
interests with the public’s interests in the rule of law. 
III.  FORGETTING WHY WE ARE HERE 
 Nonetheless, some commentators dismiss the enabling dimension of the 
lawyer, or subordinate it to the lawyer’s role as the client’s advocate.121  For 
example, James Cohen argues that the term “officer of the court” is “mostly 
rhetoric, caused by self-love and self-promotion”122—the costume of a 
charlatan, rather than the dress of a professional. 
 Cohen asserts that scholarship in legal ethics has ignored agency law 
(though he cites several counterexamples)123 and that applying its framework 
reveals that the lawyer is an agent of the client.  He claims that to accept the 
argument that the idea that “the lawyer’s duty to seek justice is superior to the 
obligation of loyalty and zealous advocacy on behalf of the client” entails a 
“profound[] change [in] the attorney’s role from that of agent for a client to 
that of agent for ‘justice.’”124  Cohen’s attempt to dismiss the officer of the 
court with a wave of the wand of agency law fails illustratively, modeling an 
extreme view of the standard conception. 
 Cohen asserts that a lawyer owes “virtually no significant duty” to the 
court that both overrides her duty to the client and is distinct from the duties of 
 
 121. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense 
Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); James A. Cohen, Lawyer 
Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization “Officer of the Court,” 48 BUFF. L. REV. 349 (2000) 
(and citations therein). 
 122. Cohen, supra note 121, at 360: 
  In fact, the notion that the attorney has a meaningful and distinct role as an “officer 
of the court” is largely an illusion caused by self-love and self-promotion.  “Careful 
analysis of the role of the lawyer within the adversarial legal system reveals the 
characterization to be vacuous and unduly self-laudatory.  It confuses lawyers and 
misleads the public.”  The perpetuation of the lawyer role as an “officer of the court” by 
the profession is tantamount to a charade. 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers As Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. 
REV. 39, 39 (1989) and citing same at 44–45).  As discussed infra, Gaetke offered a heavily 
pruned image of the lawyer’s responsibilities as a court officer to argue that the court should 
require more of lawyers, or else lawyers should give up the title—put up or shut up, as it were.  
Cohen selects only the truncated picture, and then argues that it is complete. 
 123. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 121, at 388; see also Wendel, supra note 84, at 1168 (“[A] 
lawyer is not simply an agent of her client (although the lawyer-client relationship is obviously 
governed by the law of agency).”). 
 124. Cohen, supra note 121, at 349–50 (emphasis added). 
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non-lawyers to obey the law.125  The refrain of this argument is that a lawyer 
owes to the court “no substantive duty to seek justice[.]”126 
 Acknowledging that the lawyer’s role as the client’s agent is limited in that 
the lawyer is to obey only the client’s lawful instructions, Cohen then asserts 
that because everyone is bound by the law, lawyers owe no distinctive duties to 
the court.  Cohen apparently adopts this approach from an article in which 
Eugene Gaetke defines the lawyer’s duties as a court officer artificially 
narrowly to exclude all of the officer’s duties that apply also to “laymen 
participating in the legal process.”127  For example, Gaetke notes that under 
Canon 7 of the American Bar Association Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility—which requires a lawyer to “represent a client zealously within 
the bounds of the law”128—a lawyer cannot unlawfully conceal evidence or 
information, cannot knowingly use perjured testimony or make or use false 
evidence or statements, and can neither assist a client in illegal or fraudulent 
conduct nor knowingly engage in it.  Gaetke does not regard these as a 
lawyer’s duties as an officer of the court because they apply to non-lawyers as 
well. 
 This analytical move is a misstep, in that the Code does not simply 
reproduce all of the law that applies to everyone.  Instead, it emphasizes those 
aspects of the law that bind the lawyer in particular qua officer of the court: 
Because of his position in society, even minor violations of law by a lawyer 
may tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession.  Obedience to law 
exemplifies respect for law.  To lawyers especially, respect for the law should 
be more than a platitude.129 
 Precisely because the lawyer is an officer of the court on whom the judge 
and the public rely for her function in the administration of justice, “A lawyer 
shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or 
misrepresentation,” nor “[e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the 
administration of justice.”130  As Geoffrey Hazard notes, it is “the norm of 
candor to the court on which the legitimacy of the advocate’s role depends.”131  
Further, a lawyer could be disciplined for unprofessional conduct without 
having violated the law. 
 These and the other requirements that Gaetke’s analysis dismisses are 
articulated in the Code’s Disciplinary Rules, which he focuses on because they 
 
 125. Id. at 408. 
 126. Id. at 405 & passim (e.g., 349–52, 355–88, 409). 
 127. Gaetke, supra note 122, at 49. 
 128. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1983). 
 129. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 1-5 (1983). 
 130. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(4), (5) (1983) (italics added).  A 
lawyer’s compliance with the Disciplinary Rules is mandatory. 
 131. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1261. 
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represent minimal standards for a lawyer’s conduct.132  Gaetke ignores the 
Code’s recommendations and goals for lawyer conduct, further cutting the 
lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court too close by including in its 
definition only the court’s requirements that “compel[] conduct by a lawyer 
that subordinates the interests of the client and the lawyer to those of the 
judicial system or the public[.]”133  This attempt to exclude from the lawyer’s 
official duties all of those that do not subordinate lawyer and client interests to 
judicial or public interests misconceives the role of the lawyer, rather absurdly 
relieving the officer of the court of all but a few of a long list of explicitly 
enumerated duties.  Gaetke implicitly frames the lawyer’s relation to the 
judicial system as in Fig. 2 rather than in Fig. 3, then draws a vertical center-
line through Fig. 2 and cabins the client and lawyer together on a “private” side 
that stands in opposition to the court on the “public” side.  The overpruning 
effects of this analysis that belittle the Code reveal Fig. 2 as a Picassoesque 
vision of the officer of the court.  A more empirical view of the Code as 
evidence of the lawyer’s duties134 supports the view of Fig. 3. 
 Ironically, Gaetke’s goal in interpreting the lawyer’s role as an officer of 
the court so narrowly is to argue for its expansion.  He challenges the legal 
profession to use it or lose it—to require lawyers on pain of disciplinary action: 
to provide representation pro bono; to alert the court to adverse facts as well as 
adverse law, to information that protects the innocent, and to lawyer 
misconduct; and thus to “give meaning to the role of officer of the court.”135  
However a lawyer may feel about the proposed expansion of the duties of the 
officer of the court, Gaetke need not have artificially narrowed her role to offer 
them; this strategic choice suggests that he thought his argument insufficiently 
forceful otherwise.  Unfortunately, this rhetorical move clouds our vision of 
the lawyer as an officer of the court, attenuating her manifestation as such, 
subordinating and helping us to forget her professional identity.136  Gaetke’s 
strategy backfires, contributing to the evanescence of the officer-of-the-court 
 
 132. Gaetke, supra note 122, at n.61.  But see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, 
Preliminary Statement (1983) (“The Code is designed to be adopted by appropriate agencies both 
as an inspirational guide to the members of the profession and as a basis for disciplinary action 
when the conduct of a lawyer falls below the required minimum standards stated in the 
Disciplinary Rules.” (emphasis added)). 
 133. Gaetke, supra note 122, at 49 (emphasis added). 
 134. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1250 (regarding the American Bar Association’s 1908 Canons, 
which preceded the Code: “[T]he Canons functioned not as enforceable legal standards but only 
as evidence of such standards.”). 
 135. Gaetke, supra note 122, at 91. 
 136. For example, Cohen cites Gaetke in support of his statement that the lawyer as an officer 
of the court is illusory, see Cohen, supra note 121; Deborah Rhode cites Gaetke’s limiting 
characterization of the lawyer’s duties in recommending that the bar “give greater practical 
content to professional aspirations,” Deborah L. Rhode, The Future of the Legal Profession: 
Institutionalizing Ethics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 665, 668, 708, 736 (1994). 
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role that he tries to strengthen, instead leaving us with the troubling “standard 
conception” of Fig. 1. 
 Taking Gaetke’s overpruning analysis further, Cohen identifies but “one 
duty” of the lawyer that is inconsistent with his thesis: a litigating lawyer must 
cite legal authority that is directly adverse to his client’s position.137  He 
downplays the importance of this clear and significant example of a lawyer’s 
duty to the court, which in his view, conflicts with her duty to the client: “even 
if one concludes that this is a special obligation to the court not imposed on 
non-lawyers and inconsistent with the duty of loyalty to the client, its practical 
consequences are few.”138  From this dismissively framed admission, he 
immediately concludes that: 
  In the end, the one duty to the court imposed on lawyers inconsistent with 
the duty of loyalty to the client is the duty under the Rules to cite directly 
adverse authority.  The characterization officer of the court is based on little 
more than self-serving rhetoric and does not include a substantive duty to seek 
justice that is at odds with the duty of loyalty and zealous advocacy.  A lawyer 
does not owe the court any duty of consequence greater than [that of] the non-
lawyer.139 
 From the admission that lawyers must perform a duty to the court that (as 
he sees it) is inconsistent with her duty to the client, it does not follow that the 
lawyer is not meaningfully an officer of the court—quite the contrary.  This 
duty is significant, and fits well within the role-structure discussed above: the 
lawyer’s primary duties are to uphold the Constitution as an officer of the court 
of justice that admitted her; her duties to the court may include representing a 
client in litigation (re-presenting or translating the client’s concerns into the 
pleadings and motions of a party before the court); and her professional work 
serves first the court and accordingly the client, to whom she owes duties 
concerning the quality of her representation.  Her duties to the client are 
circumscribed by her duties to the court, as depicted in Fig. 3. 
 Viewing the lawyer as the client’s agent, Cohen concludes that she is 
nothing else.  But Hazard sees the lawyer as an agent of the client without 
making this mistake.  Though Hazard goes so far as to say that without the 
client there is no lawyer,140 he nonetheless recognizes that lawyers effect or 
 
 137. Cohen, supra note 121, at 387. 
 138. Id. (footnote omitted).  Cohen further remarks in a footnote that arguably, “this rule is 
bad and should be disregarded,” because a lawyer need not disclose facts that are adverse to the 
client’s position, “which—if the goal were really justice-seeking as opposed to judicial face-
saving—might also be required.”  Id. at 387 n.198. 
 139. Id. at 387. 
 140. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Law Practice and the Limits of Moral Philosophy, in ETHICS IN 
PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION 75, 79–80 (Deborah L. 
Rhode ed., 2000) (“The distinctive feature of a ‘lawyer’ is that agency is definitional in the role.  
To speak of a lawyer without a client . . . does not describe a lawyer.”). 
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realize141 procedure: “Lawyers as advocates effectuate the right to be heard by 
providing the judge with plausible alternatives concerning the law and the 
facts.  (An advocate who provides an implausible alternative has failed in her 
preliminary responsibility to refrain from ‘frivolous’ contentions . . . .)”.142  
Hazard’s description is consistent with Fig. 3: through her actions in 
representing the client in court, the lawyer manifests due process values in 
accordance with her preliminary or prior responsibilities to the court.  But read 
in light of Fig. 3, “preliminary” indicates that the court—not the client—is the 
sine qua non of the lawyer: the hands of the court are always already open to 
represent the client, even when the hands are idle because no client is yet 
engaged. 
 Hazard finds the application of moral (or ethical143) philosophy to the 
practice of law troubled in that moral philosophy works in universals, while 
legal practice is situational. Accordingly, he discusses Hilary Putnam’s 
concern that it may be unreasonable for a person striving to perform ethically 
to make the Kantian calculation of what the effects of her actions would be if 
they were multiplied across those similarly (but not identically) situated.144  
Putnam offers the example of someone choosing whether to care for an aging 
parent or to enlist in the army in wartime to point out that a significant part of 
the difficulty of this choice inheres in its being a choice of identity: the choice 
does not simply flow from, but will determine who, the chooser is.145  As 
Hazard interprets this concern: 
His observation that the actor needs to decide who he “is” refers, I think, to the 
existentialist proposition that a course of action chosen, as distinct from merely 
hypothesized, effects a transformation of the actor himself.  Hence, in choosing 
a course of action the actor is redefining himself.146 
 Consider further the lawyer’s professional choices in relation to her 
identity.  The lawyer is critically situated within the structure of legal 
discourse, at a point where it meets a private person who would appear before 
a court.  In choosing to become a lawyer, a person identifies herself with and 
through the court.  In choosing to take on a client, the lawyer identifies herself 
as the client’s representative.  As William Simon points out, 
Even where they think of themselves as merely providing information for 
clients to integrate into their own decisions, lawyers influence clients by 
 
 141. Oxford English Dictionary Online, effectuate, v. (Draft Revision, Dec. 2008). 
 142. Hazard, supra note 140, at 81–82 (emphasis on “implausible” retained; emphasis on 
“preliminary” added). 
 143. Id. at 91 n.1. 
 144. Id. at 78. 
 145. HILARY PUTNAM, RENEWING PHILOSOPHY 190–91 (1992). 
 146. Hazard, supra note 140, at 78 (italics retained). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] WHAT IS A LAWYER? 467 
making judgments, conscious or not, about what information to present, how to 
order it, what to emphasize, and what style and phrasing to adopt.147 
Further, “in this process the lawyer inescapably exercises power over the 
client[,]” the responsibilities of which can be “emotionally overwhelming.”148 
 In a sense, by realizing procedure through her professional performance, 
the lawyer continues the court’s work of manifesting herself as its officer.  
Here again we see the maieutic logic of the Hegelian crochet, the chain of 
syntheses in which one maieutic moment begets another: the applicant to the 
bar swears the lawyer’s oath and becomes a lawyer; the lawyer effects 
procedure, making representations to the court under her certification149 and 
through them materializes the client properly before the court.150  A lawyer 
choosing to act professionally identifies herself as an officer of the court, 
whereas one who fails to act professionally disowns the court.  In realizing 
procedure, the lawyer has choices to make: she exercises her professional 
judgment to determine how to act as an officer of the court upon her client’s 
matter—how to be a lawyer. 
 David Luban explores how the stakes for a lawyer’s self-concept can be 
high when she exercises her professional judgment, and how her judgment can 
be shaped and compromised by the supervisors and colleagues with whom she 
practices: 
  Every litigation associate goes through a rite of passage: she finds a 
document that seemingly lies squarely within the scope of a legitimate 
discovery request, but her supervisor tells her to devise an argument for 
excluding it. . . .  It is the moment when withholding information despite an 
 
 147. William H. Simon, Lawyer Advice and Client Autonomy: Mrs. Jones’s Case, in ETHICS 
IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 165, 
168–69. 
 148. Id. at 175. 
 149. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) requires a lawyer making representations to the 
court to certify that the representations are not “presented for any improper purpose,” FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11(b)(1), that their “legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous 
argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law[,]” FED. 
R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), that their factual contentions have or will likely have evidentiary support, 
FED. R. CIV. P.  11(b)(3), and that any “denials of factual contentions are warranted on the 
evidence or . . . reasonably based on belief or a lack of information,” FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(4).  
This Rule requires representations to the court to have a basis in empiricism and reason, and not 
to be arbitrary. 
 150. “Certification” is synonymous with “oath”: see Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
certify, v., 1 (2d ed. 1989); Oxford English Dictionary Online, attest, v., 1.b (2d ed. 1989).  See 
also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486 (1978) (“[A]ttorneys are officers of the court, and 
‘when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are 
virtually made under oath.’” (citation omitted)). 
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adversary’s legitimate request starts to feel like zealous advocacy rather than 
deception.151 
 Luban is describing a socialization process in which a new lawyer’s sense 
of the boundary that identifies her with the court152 is confounded; eventually 
she may lose her ability to realize when she is transgressing that boundary.  
Thus, she begins to identify too closely with the client (or with the law firm 
that has been captured by the client), and to forget her identity with the court 
that deems her its officer. 
 Hazard points out the philosophical significance of the situationalism of 
law practice.  Luban then presses on to its psychological significance for the 
lawyer: “Cognitive dissonance theory teaches that when our actions conflict 
with our self-concept, our beliefs and attitudes change until the conflict is 
removed.”153  Analyzing the Milgram experiments on wrongful obedience154 
and the situation in Berkey v. Eastman Kodak Co.155, Luban suggests that there 
is a slippery slope from zealous advocacy to deception that is paved with good 
intentions: a lawyer senses how to perform ethically, but is expected by her 
supervisors and colleagues to stretch the bounds of ethical behavior (“[L]ike 
any other piece of elastic, the no-deception principle loses its grip if it is 
stretched too often”156).  As she tries to meet their expectations and reconcile 
them with her understanding of professional performance—in the process of 
her socialization as a practicing lawyer—that understanding is compromised: 
she reduces the cognitive dissonance between that understanding and her 
action by changing the understanding until the conflict is removed.  “In other 
words, our judgment gets corrupted because only by corrupting our judgment 
can we continue to think well of ourselves.  Conscience must be seduced into 
flattering our self-image.”157 
 This is an individual lawyer’s psychological path into the troubled standard 
conception of Fig. 1: the lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court evanesces 
through her actions that are dissonant or inconsistent with it, and she forgets 
whence she came to practice.  In such situations the identity of the lawyer as a 
zealous advocate is unduly self-laudatory and confusing to the lawyer: it 
 
 151. David J. Luban, The Ethics of Wrongful Obedience, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: LAWYERS’ 
ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 94, 106. 
 152. Described supra Part II.A. 
 153. Luban, supra note 151, at 102. 
 154. Id. at 97 (summarizing Stanley Milgram’s findings thus: “Two out of three people you 
pass in the street would electrocute you if a laboratory technician ordered them to.”). 
 155. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).  In the course of this 
litigation, a prominent lawyer representing Kodak lied and committed perjury to conceal 
documents that he later produced.  The lawyer’s associate incredulously witnessed his 
supervisor’s perjury, but did not report it to the court. 
 156. Luban, supra note 151, at 106. 
 157. Id. at 110–11. 
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compromises her integrity as a court officer.  The lawyer’s professional 
judgment must be independent of such corruption, for the court and the rule of 
law rely upon it.  As Luban suggests, such independence is possible.158 
 The view that frames lawyers as agents of autonomous clients relieves the 
lawyer of responsibilities that (Simon notes) can be emotionally 
overwhelming—it situates the lawyer as a Milgram compliant (per Luban) who 
need not answer for harm that she channels from the client to the judicial 
system in obeying the client.  For example, in describing the findings of the 
Ethics: Beyond the Rules Task Force of the American Bar Association, Gordon 
reports that in interviews, large-firm litigators made comments such as: “If 
clients are going to lie to me, they are going to lie to me; am I going to try to 
be a mind-reader? . . . I would hope they would be honest with me; it’s not my 
responsibility to guide them to decision.”159  At a minimum, this comment 
forgets or ignores the mandates of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) and 
Business Guides v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,160 which require a 
lawyer to certify that to the best of her knowledge after conducting a 
reasonable inquiry, representations to the court have evidentiary support.  
Forgotten as well are the mandates of the Code’s Disciplinary Rule on lawyer 
misconduct: “A lawyer shall not . . . [e]ngage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”161  Gordon’s description of the interview 
process displays cognitive-dissonance reduction at work: 
  While speaking in this “official” mode, our lawyer-informants treated the 
actual stories we used of ethically problematic conduct (usually involving 
suppression or concealment of relevant evidence in discovery) by large-firm 
lawyers as either not really raising ethical problems at all or else as isolated 
examples of lawyers being “stupid,” that is, failing to take adequate account of 
the downside risks to themselves and to their clients of rule violations.162 
Here, we see professional socialization resulting in the evanescence of the 
lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court.  Similarly finessing the court 
officer’s ethical commitments, Cohen states that “agency law forbids agents 
from engaging in conduct that is illegal, unethical, immoral, or against public 
policy”163—but in four sentences he limits unethical conduct to that which 
conflicts with the lawyer’s fiduciary duties to the client, and collapses immoral 
 
 158. Id. at 116 (“There is no reason to believe that corruption of judgment is inevitable . . . in 
the adversary system. . . .  Perhaps the best protection is understanding the illusions themselves, 
their pervasiveness, the insidious way they work on us.”  (internal citation omitted)). 
 159. Robert W. Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary 
Observations, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 709, 711 (1998) (ellipsis in original). 
 160. 498 U.S. 533 (1991). 
 161. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(a)(4) (1983). 
 162. Gordon, supra note 159, at 711. 
 163. Cohen, supra note 121, at 402 (emphasis added). 
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conduct and that which contravenes public policy into a single category, 
sweeping them under the rug of “criminal, or quasi-criminal . . . conduct 
involving alcohol, gambling, and prostitution.”164 
 Even when we focus on the lawyer as the client’s agent, the legal 
limitations on that agency role are too numerous and substantial simply to 
collapse into the realm of legal limitations on the behavior of all citizens.  For 
example, the agent with multiple principals is no stranger to agency law: even 
when a court explicitly appoints a fiduciary, such as a bankruptcy trustee for a 
corporation, or a guardian for a ward of the state, those agents also may be 
viewed as agents of the court.  Further, a trustee may have equivalent 
obligations to various family members; a corporate director may have 
hierarchized obligations to shareholders, prioritizing common shareholders 
over preferred shareholders.  A lawyer’s agency duties to her client neither 
foreclose nor subordinate her duties to the court of justice.165 
 At a minimum, the structure of Cohen’s own description of agency law 
indicates that moral limitations on the lawyer’s role complement and are 
distinct from the other three sets of limitations mentioned.  Public policy 
limitations on the lawyer’s role as the client’s agent include those entailed in 
the public’s interest in fair play and substantial justice in the workings of its 
judiciary—in the rule of law.  Cohen limits the duties of an officer of the court 
to “process obligations” that he claims are consistent with her client-advocacy 
duties,166 while asserting that being an officer of the court involves no 
substantive duty to seek justice.  Squinting at the lawyer through this narrow 
view of agency law, Cohen misses the connection between a lawyer’s 
procedural obligations and the public’s constitutionally guaranteed interests in 
fairness and justice.167 
 Gordon describes the lawyer as an agent of the client, but unlike Cohen, 
recognizes that lawyers must be “agents of the common framework of 
institutions, customs, and norms within which their client’s interests must be 
 
 164. Id. at 402–03 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted): 
  Unethical conduct seems limited to misrepresentations, self-dealing or other behavior 
conflicting with the agent’s fiduciary duties.  Immoral conduct and conduct that is against 
public policy seem limited to behavior sanctioned by criminal, or quasi criminal, statutes 
or regulations.  These terms apply to conduct involving alcohol, gambling, and 
prostitution.  None of this conduct is the object of serious interest to those advocating that 
the lawyer’s role should include a substantive duty to seek justice. 
 165. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1165, 1199 (2006) 
(“Foremost, zeal coexists with many other duties, not just the duty to obey the law, and zeal does 
not override these obligations.”). 
 166. Cohen, supra note 121, at 350.  Later, Cohen admits that the lawyer’s role as the court’s 
officer entails substantive duties as well, and then immediately reduces those to the function of 
screening meritless claims.  Id. at 358–59 & n.30. 
 167. U.S. CONST. Amend. V & XIV. 
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pursued if the premises underlying all these individual exercises of freedom are 
to be made good.”168  Gordon points out that lawyers are and must be “curators 
of the public framework[]”169 since they are “in a unique position both to 
ensure that [framework] arrangements are carried into effect and to sabotage 
them,”170—a position of public trust.  In parallel, Deborah Hensler and Judith 
Resnik argue that “because lawyers are specially situated actors within the 
justice system, their norms of professionalism must internalize law’s 
commitment to equal treatment”171; therefore, they would “includ[e], as a 
professional obligation” in addition to those of an officer of the court, 
“advocacy for and insistence on the practice of equality.”172  Bill Ong Hing 
argues for the lawyer’s duty to “work[] for the common good,”173 finding this 
duty to be consistent with her “‘obligation to the legal system in [her] capacity 
as an officer of the court’” as articulated by the American Bar Association 
Commission on Professionalism.174  Yet, for Hensler and Resnik the term 
“officer[] of the court” “no longer suffices.”175  For Gordon, the terms 
“ethics”176 and “officer of the court”177 have lost their abilities to refer to the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to “carry out the public framework-regarding aims of 
the legal system[,]”178 so he refers to these as the lawyer’s “public 
responsibilities[.]”179 
 However, as discussed above, as an officer of the court the lawyer is an 
integral part of our judicial framework that critically connects with someone 
who would be heard by the court and translates that person’s call into matter 
appropriate for legal action.  Thus, though strained in a discursive tug-of-war, 
the term “officer of the court” nonetheless refers to the public responsibilities 
that Gordon describes as well as to the function of the lawyer-as-advocate that 
Hazard describes.  Moreover, the lawyer’s function as a client-connector and 
 
 168. Robert W. Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: 
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 42, 44–45. 
 169. Id. at 47. 
 170. Id. at 45. 
 171. Deborah R. Hensler & Judith Resnik, Contested Identities, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: 
LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION, supra note 140, at 240, 242. 
 172. Id. at 255. 
 173. Hing, supra note 107, at 904. 
 174. Id. at 924 n.126 (quoting ABA COMM’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “IN THE SPIRIT OF 
PUBLIC SERVICE:” A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, 112 
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 175. Hensler & Resnik, supra note 171, at 255. 
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 179. Id. at 43. 
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translator for the court, when regarded in light of the unequal distribution of 
legal services, further implies that the bar already has an obligation to be 
socially diverse.  If a diverse bar could better effect the administration of 
justice, then the concept of the officer of the court already embraces the 
unrealized professional obligations identified by Hensler and Resnik.  But from 
Cohen’s straitened perspective, it is difficult to see the lawyer as an officer of 
the court.  Amalia Kessler argues that the discourse of adversarial ideology 
obscures our heritage from equity procedure.180  This discourse also obscures 
the established dimensions of the lawyer’s function as a court officer, and 
hinders the lawyer from more fully realizing her professional identity. 
 The view of the lawyer as an agent for representation in court rests 
comfortably within the realm of the lawyer’s duties to the court, neither 
exceeding nor superseding them.  Missing the connection between a lawyer’s 
duties to the court and to the client leads to the unnecessary conclusion that the 
“[i]mposition of duties that clash with the duty of loyalty to client—in effect 
agency duties to the court or justice—would dramatically redefine the agency 
concept and lawyer role.”181  Instead, the lawyer’s role as an officer of the 
court comprises and indeed provides for her role as the party’s advocate. 
 Interestingly, Cohen’s article is constructed more like a piece of advocacy 
than scholarship: statements dismissing the lawyer’s duty to the court of justice 
are sarcastically worded; contradicting or limiting evidence and opinion are 
downplayed, parenthesized, and pushed into footnotes; and weighty 
conclusions depend from a worn narrative thread.  Perhaps this choice of 
genre, which brackets opposing argument, reveals a great sympathy for the 
advocating lawyer and a wish to relieve her of the strain of the professional 
double-bind.  However, while energetic denial of the lawyer’s identity as an 
officer of the court reduces cognitive dissonance from the underperformance of 
the lawyer’s procedural role, it also damages both lawyers’ own and the 
public’s understandings of the legal profession.  Effectively rationalizing the 
lawyer-as-mouthpiece condemned by Chief Justice Burger,182 this denial 
forgets that the role of an officer of the court is essential—not optional—to the 
lawyer.  A lawyer who does not act as an officer of the court does not act as a 
lawyer, but merely passes herself off as one, rendering representation before 
 
 180. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the 
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1184 (2005): 
Our ability to deploy inquisitorial procedure as a remedy for the excesses of the 
adversarial has been stymied, however, by an unnecessary, adversarial ideology, based on 
a false reading of our own history.  As a result, instead of self-consciously and 
systematically reflecting on the structure and nature of inquisitorial procedure, we have 
engaged in ad hoc and often confused tinkering. 
 181. Cohen, supra note 121, at 404. 
 182. See supra Part I.B. 
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the court a charade.  In arguing from his conclusion, Cohen substitutes 
ideology for ethics. 
 Cohen also expresses concern that recognition of the officer’s duties in the 
administration of justice will allow “moral activists . . . to substitute their 
views of morality in place of the law.”183  But moral substitution does not 
follow from the observation that these duties exist.  This concern parallels 
concerns over judicial activism, that unless judges behave as ideal legal 
formalists—mechanical shuttles weaving legal discourse according to a fully 
predetermined program—judges will effect tyranny.  But we have no robot-
judges: our best hope for just adjudication relies on human judges to exercise 
their judgment, to weigh the equities of the cases before them.  We rely on 
their professionalism,184 which seems more likely to be fair and just than a 
machine would be—especially since a machine would have to be programmed 
by someone with not only legislation and common law, but with institutional 
historical knowledge, and with relative weights for applying balancing tests to 
specific constellations of facts—that is, with values to use in the calculations of 
holding.  The moral function of a judge seems inevitable, however legitimately 
we may fear its abuses.  The layered structure of our judiciary is designed to 
some extent to rein the operation of a loose-thread individual’s values in place 
of the public values reflected in the legal designs of our social fabric: appellate 
review, some ability for a party to choose a different judge, impeachment 
procedures, and codes of professional conduct for judges—the public’s legal, 
ethical, and normative professional expectations for judges—converge to shape 
our efforts to establish and administer justice pursuant to our Constitution. 
 Similarly, robot lawyers do not assist our judges.  Instead, we rely on the 
lawyer’s professional judgment to protect the integrity of the adversarial 
system of justice.  Like judges, lawyers are bound by prescriptive and 
proscriptive rules, ethics and norms to perform not as agents of their own (nor 
of any individual’s) personal value systems, but as officers of the court.  That 
is, the public relies upon lawyers to perform their professional duties according 
to the system of laws and values that provides for and directs the court to 
establish justice.185  The lawyer is present because she swore to “serve, protect, 
 
 183. Cohen, supra note 121, at 409.  Cohen further suggests that lawyers subject to scruples 
of conscience can’t stand the heat and should get out of the kitchen.  Id.: 
For those moral activists who are uncomfortable with the tension that exists when there is 
a difference between what the law allows and their morality and values the answer is 
urging law reform or another occupation.  The answer is not for moral activists to deny 
clients access to the law, or worse, to substitute their views of morality in place of the law. 
 184. See, e.g., Sandra Day O’Connor, Fair & Independent Courts, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 
8; Stephen Breyer, Serving America’s Best Interests, DAEDALUS, Fall 2008, at 139. 
 185. U.S. CONST. Preamble (we establish our Constitution in part to “establish Justice”); see 
also Oxford English Dictionary Online, justice, n., II.5.a (2d ed. 1989) (“The administration of 
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foster and promote the fair and impartial administration of justice,”186 and is 
bound by her oath to uphold the Constitution.  The lawyer’s ability to keep her 
oath, to be as good as her word, is central to her professional identity and 
integrity.  The view that lawyers have “no substantive duty to seek justice”187 
urges that Constitutional, historical, and structural manifestations of our courts 
do not matter. 
 As the myopic view of the lawyer as a mere client-advocate ostensibly 
frees her from the double-bind, it unmoors her from the very legal institutions 
that formed her to assist in their function.  Relying on the professionalism of 
individual judges and lawyers in our adversary system of justice may give us 
pause, but relaxing their professional constraints should send us reeling.  
Cohen expresses concern that if the lawyer were meaningfully an officer of the 
court, she might “substitute [her] own views of morality in place of the 
law”188—but the court’s officer is to use her professional judgment to represent 
the client—to embody the values of the court of justice in our legal system 
according to her oath, rather than to abuse her office to promote her own or her 
client’s private agenda.  If the lawyer forgets her functions as an officer of the 
court—if we render the lawyer as an empty vessel for the client—then our real 
concern becomes the unchecked flow of the client’s own purposes into the 
court, without the professional representation that the court appointed the 
lawyer to perform.  Cohen’s argument would deprive the lawyer of 
professional agency, relieving her of the responsibility to exercise professional 
judgment as an officer of the court. 
 Norman Spaulding describes a situation that similarly troubles the lawyer’s 
representation to the court, in which there is “[i]ntense identification between 
lawyer and client” or “thick professional identity.”189  Spaulding suggests that 
“much in the way of contemporary professional misconduct and malaise[,]” 
such as “role confusion [and] lawlessness [inter alia]” is attributable to a 
normative shift towards a thickening professional identity for the lawyer.190  In 
terms of my analysis, this normative shift places the lawyer more completely in 
the realm of the client’s interests, straining her identity as the court’s officer.  
However, the lawyer is not merely a passive screen between private interests 
and the court, but is instead an active functionary of the court who shapes a 
client’s situation into a legally meaningful form appropriate for the court’s 
 
law, or the forms and processes attending it; judicial proceedings; in early use, Legal proceedings 
of any kind[.]”). 
 186. See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 187. Cohen, supra note 121, at 405 & passim (e.g., 349–52, 355–88, 409). 
 188. Id. at 409. 
 189. Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 7 
(2003). 
 190. Id. 
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recognition and action.  This means that the lawyer has a thick professional 
identity with respect to the court, and accordingly should have a thin 
professional identity with respect to the client.  This thin identity with the 
client also protects the lawyer’s personal identity, allowing the lawyer to 
represent the client competently even when she does not personally value his 
cause, and protects the lawyer’s integrity as an officer of the court.191  When 
the lawyer acts as Cohen’s unmoored client-agent, or as Spaulding’s too-
thickly-client-identified lawyer, the client manifests before the court 
improperly, and the integrity of the court’s weave is compromised—the social 
fabric weakens. 
 Further, the standard conception is symptomatic of “our current procedural 
ailments” that Kessler traces to our “Failure to recall . . . the quasi-inquisitorial 
nature of our equity tradition”: this tradition valued due process as a check on 
arbitrary state action, and for its truth-seeking function that promoted justice 
by ensuring that meritorious claims would prevail.192  The adversary system of 
justice depends on a neutral decisionmaker to decide who has what right, based 
on presentations of honest (and not misleading) legal arguments193 supported 
by accurate (and not false or misleading) facts194.  The rule of law is promoted 
over arbitrary decisionmaking by the court’s empirical reach through its 
lawyers into the realm of the client.  The lawyer is present to effect this 
reach—not to misdirect it. 
 Spaulding’s discussion of the potentially “thin professional identity” of the 
lawyer, in which she performs competently for the client regardless of whether 
she personally approves of the client’s cause, provides another response to 
Cohen’s concern about the lawyer’s improper use of the client’s cause.  
Though Spaulding emphasizes the lawyer’s duties to the client in his 
discussion, this aspect of the lawyer’s role survives the shift to the framework 
of Fig. 3, in which the lawyer is first and always the officer of the court, having 
duties both to the court and to the client to manifest the client before it as fully 
as possible (i.e., with a thin professional identity) subject to the rules of the 
 
 191. See Gordon, supra note 99, at 13 (“[A]lthough lawyers’ services and technical skills are 
for sale, their personal and political convictions are not, for they each have a core identity that 
must be exempt from commodification.  The loyalty purchased by the client is limited, because a 
part of the lawyer’s professional persona must be set aside for dedication to public purposes.”); 
John T. Noonan, Jr., Propter Honoris Respectum: The Lawyer Who Overidentifies with His 
Client, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 827, 841 (2001) (The lawyer “must attend to a plurality of 
goods—the good of the client, the good of the courts, the good of the lawyer’s partners, and even 
in degree the good of the other parties. . . .  To serve professionally the persons embodying these 
purposes, a lawyer cannot . . . contract his or her identity to the client’s.”). 
 192. Kessler, supra note 180, at 1251. 
 193. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
 194. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(3)–(4). 
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circumscribing realm—the constraints of law, legal ethics, and professional 
norms to which the lawyer’s professional performance must conform. 
 The discourses of adversarial ideology and the standard conception make 
us forget why we are here, obscuring the lawyer’s professional identity.  But 
the lawyer’s professional identity as an officer of the court is essential to the 
rule of law: we rely on it to ensure that the power of our courts protects not 
only private parties, but also our shared interest in the rule of law. 
IV.  WHY ALWAYS THE FIGHTING? 
 I have shown that the standard conception of the lawyer as exclusively or 
primarily the client’s agent is historically, legally, structurally, and functionally 
false; that it can result from backfiring rhetorical framing; and that it can result 
in psychologically untenable professional socialization.  Clearly, lawyers have 
substantial duties in the administration of justice as officers of the court.  Why, 
then, do some advocate for client advocacy to the point where the officer of the 
court fails to matter?  How is the profound oath that forms lawyers to the 
profession rendered as lip-service, as if members of the bar had entered the 
legal profession with their fingers crossed behind their backs? 
 This occurs when attempts to remind lawyers of their roles as officers of 
the court—to weave the structure of adversarial system closer to the pattern 
that it was designed to embody—are framed instead as attempts to dispense 
with it and its values of autonomy.  However, if autonomy were the primary 
value of the adversary system of justice, it would be no system at all, but a 
free-for-all realm of might-makes-right.  This re-framing might favor those 
who perceive a deprivation of power from the just operation of law, even when 
the reallocation of power in particular cases would result in a stronger social 
fabric for all.  As litigation becomes more complex, the court relies all the 
more on the fair representations of its officers, and it becomes ever more 
important to the public that the lawyer embody an officer of the court as she 
represents a party before it.195 
 It is also clear that the adversary system is not an end in itself; rather, it is a 
means for serving justice.  It is supposed that through the equally skilled legal 
representation of only two opposed sides, the truth of a matter will emerge so 
 
 195. Judge Rubin’s argument that as factual complexity increases so does our reliance on the 
lawyer’s professionalism is even more timely now than when he made it.  Judge Alvin B. Rubin, 
Trial by Jury in Complex Civil Cases: Voice of Liberty or Verdict by Confusion?, 462 ANNALS 
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 87, 101 (1982): 
  Recognizing this, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is 
proposing changes to impose higher standards on counsel and to encourage judges to 
impose sanctions on counsel who abuse the judicial process.  The American Bar 
Association is considering changes in its Code of Professional Responsibility to require 
greater fidelity to the cause of justice in counsel’s conduct of litigation. 
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that the judge may treat it.196  Prioritizing the adversarial aspects of our justice 
system subordinates its raisons d’être, brushing aside the purposes that it exists 
to serve.  Setting the scale of the debate at the level of the individual lawyer 
leaves the profession that creates, sustains and commits the lawyer out of the 
picture—so that the lawyer appears only to serve client interests. 
A. Reconstruction of the Lawyer’s Professional Identity 
 The present analysis begins with the hypothesis that a lawyer is 
meaningfully an officer of the court, and finds evidence for the lawyer’s 
professional identity as such in legal history and common law, and in the 
structure and function of the current judicial system.  This analysis focuses on 
the formation of the lawyer’s professional identity as an instance of the 
formation of an identity generally, in terms of its interpellation, socialization, 
and potential suspension or destruction, and examines the nature of that 
identity in terms of its performance.  Professional performance is the play of 
professional identity: the lawyer’s professional performance entails the 
exercise of independent professional judgment to translate between the public 
and private realms, assisting in the formation of binding connections between 
the two in accordance with the rule of law.  Professional judgment extends 
beyond idiosyncratic personal judgment in that it is socialized to the norms of 
the legal profession, some of which have been articulated in terms of 
professional canons, considerations, rules and opinions.  The lawyer’s 
professional conscience is at the core of her professional identity as an officer 
of the court, which is vital to the administration of justice. 
 This theory of the lawyer’s professional identity further suggests that the 
lawyer’s identity and professional actions can be understood as links in chains 
of softly dialectical synthetic acts that form new discursive entities through the 
application of a maieutic logic that reifies the private individual in publicly 
intelligible and material forms.  Though this view may sound abstract, 
theorizing the lawyer’s professional identity is a practical endeavor,197 in that it 
considers how procedural justice and the rule of law are effected in substantial 
part through the lawyer’s professional performance.  This approach to 
 
 196. Note that even if the lawyers representing the two sides were perfectly professional 
officers of the court striving to put before the judge the best arguments based solely on honest 
representations, the flattening of a complex situation onto only two opposed sides itself may 
impede the court’s development of a more accurate and complete factual picture of the matter.  
As does increasing factual complexity, factual distortion that inherently arises from the bilateral 
structure of the adversarial system places all the more weight on the lawyers’ professionalism as 
the court’s officers. 
 197. Wendel, supra note 84, at 1198.  Lawyers have long sought clear guidance as to “how to 
reconcile a lawyer’s obligations to the court with his obligations to his client” so that they would 
know how to behave professionally; see Curtis, supra note 87, at 11. 
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theorizing the lawyer’s identity and ethics complements others’ analyses in 
interesting ways. 
B. Identity Theory and Legal Ethics 
1. Purposivism 
 Simon describes purposivism as an “interrupted tradition” premised on the 
idea that “legal rules and institutions should be elaborated and applied to 
effectuate their purposes.”198  He notes that the professional ethic that 
purposivism implies “strives to directly connect the lawyer’s service to 
individual clients to the values that underlie applicable legal norms.”199  The 
idea of professionalism to which purposivism contributes “proposed a 
conception of work that united self-assertion with social commitment and 
service to private interest with respect for public norms.”200  Simon further 
describes a purposivist approach to resolving ambiguities about the lawyer’s 
role by “asking what lawyer conduct would best vindicate the relevant 
substantive norms and would best promote fair adjudication of the dispute” in 
a way that contemplates the lawyer’s exercise both of “ordinary morality”201 
and of a faculty that resembles the “professional conscience” discussed by Fred 
Zacharias and Bruce Green.202  Simon notes that, “To a surprising extent, 
recent academic theorizing about professional responsibility fails to engage 
this tradition and often ignores it completely,”203 and urges that this 
perspective “deserves more consideration than much recent academic 
professional responsibility discourse has given it.”204 
 The present functional analysis of the lawyer’s role harmonizes with 
Simon’s call, finding the lawyer engaged in the process of elaborating legal 
rules and institutions as simultaneously an officer of the court and a client 
representative, embodying and crafting connections between the public 
institution of law and the private party.  The lawyer’s professional identity 
emerges in the exercise of her independent professional judgment as she 
contributes to the construction of law at a nexus between these realms, crafting 
arguments and counterarguments to help in extending the general law to 
specific cases.  The lawyer’s professional performance requires her to decide 
which of her choices would best meet not only the letter but also the goals of 
the law, including her Constitutional commitment to fair play and substantial 
 
 198. Simon, supra note 108, at 1007. 
 199. Id. at 1008. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1009. 
 202. Zacharias & Green, supra note 90. 
 203. Simon, supra note 108, at 1008. 
 204. Id. at 1009. 
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justice; this ethic that governs her professional performance may provide a 
point of contact between the present theory and the purposivism that Simon 
describes. 
 The lawyer’s professional conscience that Zacharias and Green describe is 
neither the lawyer’s personal (and thus potentially arbitrary or idiosyncratic) 
conscience, nor that of her client assumed by the lawyer in her professional 
role as a client-agent; instead, the lawyer’s professional conscience arises from 
her duties to the court and its legal system function of effecting justice.205  It is 
tempting to map this conscience onto the officer of the court here described, 
but the reconstructed lawyer is not a divided self: the lawyer represents her 
client as an officer of the court.  Since the lawyer cannot be a client-agent 
without first and always being an officer of the court, the professional 
conscience of the reconstructed lawyer necessarily, fully governs her 
performance of both roles.  The lawyer herself embodies a site of translation 
between the client and the court; the lawyer’s professionalism in translation 
entails ethical advocacy, which includes the duty to make true translations and 
is informed by the exercise of a conscience that has been socialized, formed 
and disciplined, as that of an officer of the court. 
2. Independent Professional Judgment 
 The present analysis examines the question of the lawyer’s professional 
identity—its formation and function in the legal system—and finds a coherent 
professional subject to legal ethics.  The question of this identity is contested in 
that some commentators focus on only one of its aspects, while others indicate 
that the lawyer is something more: this is the question whether the lawyer is 
simply a client’s “mouthpiece”206 or is instead an integral part of the 
administration of justice with professional duties to the court. 
 Under the present analysis, the “something more” is everything: the 
assertion of the lawyer-as-mouthpiece so oversimplifies the lawyer’s role that 
it misses her basic functions as a discerning translator contributing to social 
order.  While in contrast, Wendel points out that there is more to the lawyer 
than her agency for the client, his “more” is narrower and potentially points in 
a different direction: Wendel argues that in interpreting the law, the lawyer has 
a professional obligation to remain beyond the role of client-agent and consider 
legal norms (“public norms regulating the understanding of legal texts”) as 
 
 205. Zacharias & Green, supra note 90. 
 206. Monroe H. Freedman & Abbe Smith, Review: Markovits: A Modern Legal Ethics: 
Adversary Ethics in a Democratic Age, 108 MICH. L. REV. 925, 937 (2010) (reviewing 
MARKOVITS, supra note 89) (“Let us say it plainly: a lawyer is a mouthpiece in the sense that one 
of the lawyer’s most important functions is to speak for the client’s interest in the most persuasive 
way possible.” (citation omitted)). 
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well as the letter of the law.207  Thus, Wendel allows for the lawyer’s exercise 
of professional judgment, and constrains that judgment by legal norms of 
textual interpretation.  However, the ethics of translation, representation and 
interpretation inherent in the lawyer’s identity as an officer of the court apply 
not only to construing the law for the client but to all of the lawyer’s 
professional acts, and thus are not exhausted by the legal interpretive norms 
that Wendel describes.  Further, Wendel identifies the basis of these norms as 
the standards of “an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to 
law,”208 though of course a law may be unjust, and we may make many moves 
in trying to define and identify a community that is faithful only to just laws, 
and perhaps agree only on a set of counterexamples.  This problem underscores 
the importance of the lawyer’s exercise of judgment that is both professional—
socialized to the legal profession as described here—and independent, 
allowing the lawyer to have a critical professional perspective on the law as 
well.  Judges sit simultaneously in law and equity, and lawyers must be able to 
advise them in both registers. 
 In his analysis of a crisis in legal ethics, Hazard notes that the question of 
ethics reaches into the question of the lawyer’s professional identity within the 
social system.209  Also pointing from legal ethics to professional identity, Alice 
Woolley and W. Bradley Wendel offer a psychological approach to legal ethics 
that reframes questions about what a lawyer should do in terms of how or who 
(what kind of person) a lawyer should be.210  Emphasizing that a lawyer in a 
law firm experiences socialization pressures from other members of the 
firm,211 Woolley and Wendel liken to Hercules “the ethical actor inherent”212 
in Simon’s theory, concluding that “Simon’s lawyer is, in a word, a 
maverick”213—primarily because she is expected to exercise independent 
professional judgment.214  Similarly, “Luban’s lawyer must . . . have a degree 
 
 207. Wendel, supra note 84, at 1191. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1240 (“My root question is . . . Who is ‘we’ when it is said 
‘We lawyers . . .’?”). 
 210. Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1065 (2010). 
 211. Id. at 1083 (“This [independence] is a remarkable feat given the findings of social 
psychologists, who have shown that individuals acting in groups tend to take cues from those 
around them when interpreting ambiguous situations.”). 
 212. Id. at 1074. 
 213. Id. at 1083. 
 214. See, e.g., id. at 1082 (italics omitted): 
Simon grants no leeway to the lawyer, refusing to condone reliance on the client or 
anyone else (including the judgments about justice embodied in legal norms), instead 
making the rendering of such jurisprudential judgments the heart of the lawyer’s ethical 
obligation. . . . 
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of independence of thought, and a disregard for the fact that her opinions will 
be unpopular in the institutional and professional context within which she 
works.”215  Stressing the importance of a lawyer’s ability to work within an 
institutional structure, Woolley and Wendel then ask whether it is desirable 
and realistic for lawyers to be people like Simon’s lawyer and Luban’s lawyer; 
determining that these ideal lawyers “cannot function easily within an 
institution[,]” they suggest that their analysis is “seriously problematic for both 
theories.”216 
 The officer of the court that I describe is interpellated by the court 
primarily to exercise her independent professional judgment217—to determine 
on Gordon’s empty stage how she will professionally represent a party before 
the court.  While her ability maieutically to represent her client’s interests 
requires her to bracket her personal interests—to use what Daniel Markovits 
describes as her “negative capability”218—she is nonetheless required to 
manifest the client’s position subject to the integrity of the legal process.219  
The court and thereby the public relies on her independence from (or thin 
identity with) the client to realize our best efforts in the administration of 
justice.  A lawyer whose identity is monopolized by the client’s interests is a 
Trojan horse: a tool used to undermine the public justice system for the 
relatively exclusive benefit of the private party.  Another way of expressing 
this is to say that a properly functioning lawyer is only secondarily 
interpellated by her client, while primarily interpellated by the court.  A law 
firm that socializes, or calls forth, a lawyer to identify and act primarily as a 
lever for its clients misinterpellates the lawyer, sirening her to forget her 
professional identity as a court officer. 
 In response to Woolley and Wendel, Luban suggests that regarding as 
unrealistic or dysfunctional the exercise of independent professional and moral 
 
Most significantly, Simon’s lawyer is not relieved of the obligation of deciding what 
justice requires by the fact that the law permits something. 
 215. Id. at 1089. 
 216. Woolley & Wendel, supra note 210, at 1097. 
 217. That the court relies on the lawyer’s independence is clear, particularly since the Court 
states as much in its description of the duties of the public defender as a court officer.  See supra 
Part I.B. 
 218. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 11 (italics retained): 
[L]awyers, like poets, are specialists in what I call (following Keats) negative capability: 
that is, in the capacity to speak not in one’s own voice but rather, effacing one’s private 
judgments, faithfully and authentically to render the subjectivity of another—in the case 
of lawyers by giving voice to clients who would otherwise remain inarticulate. 
 219. Otherwise, the court officer is subject to private capture: by “identifying with particular 
types of clients or causes [she] always represent[s],” she “threatens to confuse negative capability 
with positive commitment to their side.”  David Luban, A Modern Legal Ethics: Adversary 
Advocacy in a Democratic Age, 120 ETHICS 864, 868 (2010) (reviewing MARKOVITS, supra note 
89). 
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judgment by a lawyer in a law firm is more appropriately a critique of the law 
firm than of a theory of legal ethics.220  I would add that not only should a law 
firm value its lawyers’ independent judgment, but that a firm’s failure to do so 
obstructs the function of the legal system.  Interestingly, Woolley and Wendel 
note that “[l]aw firms, corporations, and government are institutions within 
which lawyers work, but the legal system itself is an institution within which 
lawyers are intended to function, and the operation of which lawyers are 
intended to foster and protect.”221  In that case, framing the lawyer fully within 
her role as an officer of the court affords her some psychological comfort after 
all: fulfilling her (primary) duties to the public requires her to act and to be like 
a Simonian and Lubanian lawyer—and thus to function well within our legal 
system. 
 Both Hazard and Russell Pearce note the impact of the client as a business 
entity on the lawyer’s professional identity.  Hazard has analyzed 
Tocqueville’s reading of American lawyers as aristocrats, and described 
lawyers as elites whose “role was actualized in our society by linking the legal 
profession to the courts, on one end, and to business enterprise on the other 
end.”222  Hazard theorized a crisis in lawyers’ ethics and identity as an attack 
from the left on their ties to business, and from the right on lawyers’ elitism.  
Pearce also sees the lawyer as an elite, who performs a “governing class” role 
that has been thinning along the lines of a “Business-Profession” dichotomy as 
lawyers regard themselves either as hired guns or as public servants.223  Pearce 
notes, however, that the dichotomy could be abandoned by lawyers’ 
identifying thickly with the governing class role. 
 The governing class role may be analogized in some respects to the 
officer-of-the-court role; to the extent that the analogy holds, the lawyer’s thick 
identity with that originary role is appropriate.  Like Spaulding, I see the 
necessity to the lawyer’s function of her thin identification with her client224—
but unlike Spaulding, I see the necessity arising neither directly nor primarily 
(but instead, indirectly and secondarily) from the norm of client service.  I 
perceive that her identity and function as an officer of the court is the lawyer’s 
sine qua non, and maintain that the lawyer requires a thicker professional 
identity with the court than with the client to function effectively in the 
administration of justice. 
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 222. Hazard, supra note 68, at 1278. 
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3. Functional Analysis and Reconstruction of the Lawyer’s Professional 
Identity 
 The understanding of the lawyer that results from the present analysis 
regards her function as a client counselor and representative as integral but 
logically subordinate to her originary and overarching function as an officer of 
the court.  Debates about whether the lawyer is primarily a client advocate or 
court officer thus are not chicken-or-egg debates that are doomed to spin 
eternally: the strained argument that the lawyer is nothing but an agent of the 
client results from an artificially narrow view of the lawyer.  Related 
arguments that the term “officer of the court” is empty are themselves hollow, 
as seen in an example provided by Robert Martineau.  Martineau argues that 
the title “officer of the court” is used by courts as a mere excuse for the courts’ 
dependence upon and regulation of the lawyer, and that such use is 
“dangerous” because “the label will soon become a substitute for the necessary 
functional analysis.”225  This paper presents the necessary functional analysis, 
which shows that the title has a substantive meaning that is fundamental to the 
lawyer’s professional identity and is essential to the lawyer’s function in the 
administration of justice. 
 The closest methodological approach to that of this paper is the 
reconstructive analysis of the lawyer’s role provided by Daniel Markovits in A 
Modern Legal Ethics, which parallels the present analysis in intriguing ways.  
First, Markovits attributes to lawyers in their professional functions the vices 
of ordinary lying and cheating, finding these vices to result not from excessive 
zeal, but instead to be “deeply ingrained in the genetic structure of adversary 
advocacy.”226  So, rather than pose hypothetical dilemmas in legal ethics and 
consider how the law of lawyering might be developed better to manage them, 
Markovits engages in an interpretive reconstruction of the adversary system 
and the lawyer’s function within it.  His analysis essentially regards these 
lawyerly vices as symptoms of the lawyer’s proper professional functions, 
which he describes in terms of the proposed lawyerly virtues of negative 
capability and fidelity.  He suggests that the lawyer’s self-understanding in 
terms of these virtues opens the possibility of her maintaining personal 
integrity while functioning as a legal professional, and of a felicitous 
conclusion to the story of legal ethics—though in the end, he diagnoses the 
lawyer’s professional situation as one of tragic villainy, for modern society 
does not afford to lawyers the cultural resources needed to sustain their 
integrity. 
 
 225. Robert J. Martineau, The Attorney As an Officer of the Court: Time to Take the Gown off 
the Bar, 35 S.C. L. REV. 541, 572 (1983). 
 226. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 2. 
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 My approach similarly has not been to pose hypotheticals to the law of 
lawyering, but instead to engage in an interpretive reconstruction of the 
lawyer’s professional identity.  It is helpful to compare our analyses more 
closely, for despite interesting resonances between them, their conclusions 
diverge. 
i. Divergent Reconstructions 
 Both the present analysis and Markovits’ explore how the judge and the 
lawyer relate, noting the structural separation and functional division of labor 
between the lawyer and the judge.  Whereas Markovits emphasizes a moral 
division of labor and its importance to the political legitimacy of the legal 
process, I focus on its epistemological aspects.  As Markovits states, “the 
forms of adjudication that [his argument] describes will fall short of producing 
justice[.]”227  Nonetheless, to the extent that the administration of justice is a 
real or even ostensible purpose of the legal process, the truth-values of the 
factual and argumentative statements on which adjudication is based matter.  
But Markovits passes over the epistemological aspects of this division of labor.  
For example, in noting that his ethical analysis applies to inquisitorial systems 
as well, he mentions that the German system of adjudication shares with that of 
the U.S. a structural separation between advocate and tribunal: “outside the 
realm of fact-gathering, German civil procedure is about as adversarial as our 
own.”228  However, this distinguishing characteristic between the role-based 
duties of U.S. and German lawyers has important consequences for the 
lawyer’s integrity: that the latter are responsible for arguing in an adversarial 
way, but not for gathering facts adversarially, shifts fundamental 
epistemological work across the divide from the lawyer to the judge.  This shift 
simplifies the lawyer’s functions, rendering the structure of the German legal 
system better able to promote the lawyer’s professional integrity in that 
lawyers have little opportunity and less incentive to mis-represent facts.  
Judicial integrity then becomes more directly subject to the burden of 
developing complete and accurate facts, and the judge’s lack of bias in favor of 
a party becomes even more crucial to the rule of law. 
 Considering the epistemological aspects of the division of labor between 
the judge and the lawyer foregrounds the significance of lying and cheating as 
particularly vicious acts for a lawyer.  The soundness of a judicial opinion 
depends on the quality of the facts on which the opinion is based; thus, its 
justification is vitiated when a lawyer places before the fact-finder evidence 
that is inaccurate or is crafted to lead the fact-finder’s judgment astray.  Yet 
according to Markovits, “Unlike juries and judges, adversary lawyers should 
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not pursue a true account of the facts of a case . . . . Instead, they should try 
aggressively to manipulate both the facts and the law to suit their clients’ 
purposes. . . . In short, lawyers must lie.”229 
 This interpretation of the lawyer’s function ignores how deeply her work 
affects the epistemic basis of adjudication, which contributes both to its 
legitimacy and to its possibility of justice.  Discerning the lawyer’s function as 
an officer of the court compels the realization that a lawyer is duty-bound to 
strive to develop a true account of the facts of a case, and a fortiori that the 
lawyer must not manipulate facts to lower their truth-value—for in doing so, 
the lawyer manipulates the fact-finder away from the possibility of producing a 
legitimate and just opinion.  All actors in the legal system have a duty not to 
undermine the epistemological basis of justice (the administration of which is 
the court’s raison d’être): lawyers, parties, judges, court reporters—must not 
lie. 
 The legal system230 relies on judges to make well informed, reasonable and 
impartial decisions, rather than arbitrary rulings.  The judge relies on the 
lawyer to call his attention to facts concerning her client that are neither false 
nor misleading, and then to make the best argument for her party that she can 
on the basis of those facts.  Yet under Markovits’ description, lawyers “should 
strive disproportionately and at times almost exclusively to promote their 
clients’ interests.  This requires lawyers to . . . employ delaying tactics, file 
strategically motivated claims, or exploit a law’s form to thwart its substantive 
purposes.  In short, lawyers must cheat.”231  The “almost” suggests that 
Markovits senses the boundaries of the lawyer’s professional duty, marked in 
part by her Rule 11 certifications that she is not making a representation to the 
court “for any improper purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation,” and that her legal arguments are 
“warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, 
modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”232  Of 
course, Markovits is aware of Rule 11, and reasonably reads it to leave open 
the possibility for a lawyer to make a legal argument that she “believe[s] will 
(and should) lose.”233  But to function in the administration of justice, the court 
must be able to rely on the lawyer’s representations that “to the best of [her] 
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under 
 
 229. Id. at 3. 
 230. I use the term “court” both in the literal sense discussed supra Part I.C.—the lawyer is an 
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system: a court is an organ of the legal system.  A lawyer is an officer of the court, and is thus a 
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 231. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 3–4 (italics added). 
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the circumstances,”234 her arguments are supported by evidence (not lies) and 
presented for proper purposes (not to cheat).  The lawyer’s good-faith belief 
that her representations comply with Rule 11 indicates not only a duty not to 
throw the game (or engage in manifest injustice), but also an epistemological 
duty not to bias or unfairly persuade the judge: a lawyer must not cheat. 
 Markovits sees virtues in the lawyer that could accommodate the purported 
institutional needs to lie and cheat within an integrated professional identity: 
negative capability, and fidelity.  Comparing the lawyer’s maieutic functions 
that I describe with Markovits’ lawyerly virtues shows how both of our 
analyses can go farther than Markovits pressed. 
 I earlier described the maieutic ethic as a professional ethic that “requires 
the professional to serve as a faithful translator, speaking for those whose 
voices have been unintelligible and thus have not mattered”235 in a professional 
system. 
 Markovits analogously adapts the term “negative capability” from Keats’ 
description of a poet’s function:236 negative capability is a capacity “for 
assisting persons who cannot themselves speak in a way that engages the 
authoritative institutions of government to state their claims in an undistorted 
and yet effective fashion.”237  Negative capability entails self-effacement: as 
the poet “maintain[s] ‘no identity’ of [her] own, and (through this self-
effacement) . . . work[s] continually as a medium, ‘filling some other body—
The Sun, the Moon, the Sea . . .’ and rendering this ordinarily mute body 
articulate,” so does the lawyer “enable[] her otherwise inarticulate clients to 
speak through her.”238 
 I have described maieusis as boundary work that requires one to bracket 
one’s personal interests, and so to exercise one’s independent professional 
judgment in: preventing improper material from crossing the boundary, acting 
on information from one side of the boundary so that it may pass to the other 
side in a proper form, and “allow[ing] information to cross the boundary with 
high fidelity.”239 
 Similarly, to accompany negative capability, Markovits sees another 
distinctively lawyerly virtue associated with this capacity to give voice to the 
voiceless in high fidelity.  Lawyerly fidelity involves more than merely 
partisan partiality in favor of clients over others; it also includes the capacity 
accurately to identify and to articulate clients’ points of view, including even 
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in clients who are themselves inarticulate (and to do so without distortion from 
the lawyers’ own views of what their clients deserve or ought to prefer).240 
 Markovits’ negative capability corresponds to the bracketing (or 
effacement) that allows one to act as a medium or channel for something other 
than oneself, and Markovits’ fidelity corresponds to the professional duty to 
represent the other without distortion.  However, he does not extend the virtues 
of his analysis to the lawyer’s identity or functions with respect to the court.  
When we think of a lawyer as a client-advocate it follows that the lawyer must 
not replace the client’s interests with her own—but this is only part of the 
story.  The lawyer is not a mere mouthpiece for the client; instead, the lawyer 
performs the representation in a dual role: that of an officer of the court who 
translates the client into a party to a legal action.  As a maieutic actor on behalf 
of the legal system, the lawyer’s boundary work further entails screening 
improper material (whether false, misleading or simply irrelevant) from the 
court, and translating the client’s material interests into matter appropriate for 
legal action.  On the empty stage of the lawyer’s negative capability, she crafts 
the engagement of the public legal system with the private client, and only out 
of fidelity to the former is she available to the latter. 
 Even within the narrower view of the lawyer, the assertion that the lawyer 
lies on behalf of her client is an assertion that she fails in her Markovitsian 
fidelity, for if she were to make a false statement, she would distort and mis-
represent the client.  If in her professional judgment she determines to be false 
a proposition that her client would make to the court, then she must not make 
it.  Further, the assertion that the lawyer lies is an assertion that she fails in her 
negative capability—for by definition, to lie she must assert something that she 
believes to be false.  Professionally, she is bound to assert the screening beliefs 
reflected in Rule 11: that in good faith and after diligence she believes her 
propositions to be supported by evidence, warranted by law, and neither false 
nor misleading.  It would be unprofessional to press further personally to 
endorse as true or to repudiate as false a proposition that she believes to be not-
false-and-perhaps-true, for such endorsement or repudiation would overstep 
 
 240. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 5 (italics retained).  Although he describes negative 
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her role in the epistemological division of labor, usurping the fact-finder’s 
office in assigning to the proposition a truth-value. 
 The vices that Markovits contextualizes in virtue map into my analysis 
either beyond the reach of the officer of the court, or as symptoms of her 
maieutic performance.  I have used the work of the actor to describe maieutic 
performance more generally: 
[R]epresentation of [the actor] in a professional role signals to the audience 
that she is not about to speak as a private person, but as a representative of 
something else.  Were a professional actor named “Ian Holm” to portray 
Hamlet, he would be understood not to be lying to his audience by saying, 
“This is I, Hamlet the Dane,” but to be representing the truth of the character 
portrayed.241 
The context of the actor’s performance alerts her audience that they are to 
recognize that she is playing a role, and that her role morality as an actor not 
only allows but requires her to make statements that re-present the character.  
Similarly, the context of the lawyer’s performance (especially identifying 
herself as the client’s counsel) signals to those who see her performance that 
they are not to assume that she believes that what she is saying is true, nor that 
she personally favors the arguments she puts forward on behalf of her client.  
Instead, her audience is to recognize that she is playing a role, performing 
professionally the representation of her client as a party to a legal action, and 
that her role morality not only allows but requires her to put forward facts that 
favor the client (but not frauds, misrepresentations, etc.) and to argue from 
them as best she can—all within the duties binding her originary role as an 
officer of the court.  The lawyer performs dual roles simultaneously, and the 
audience—especially the judge or jury—should and must be able to rely on her 
performing both roles harmoniously—else we cannot rely on the integrity of 
the legal system, which depends on the proper function of each court. 
 Markovits addresses arguments that liken lawyers to actors in an effort to 
controvert his diagnosis that lawyers lie and cheat.  He characterizes these 
arguments as having two elements: that lawyers’ statements do not assert what 
they say, and that lawyers personally are dissociated from their statements. 
 To the first element, he replies that “whereas actors’ statements promote 
only the suspension of disbelief, lawyers’ statements promote false belief,”242 
and that promoting false belief is closer to the ordinary vice of lying.  
However, the epistemological expectations of the audience for the actor and 
the lawyer diverge.  The lawyer’s audience is more actively engaged in the 
epistemological work of the performance—not lowering its epistemological 
standards to let fictional ideas play on its mind as the actor’s audience does, 
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but instead scrutinizing the performance to determine what should materialize 
as the knowledge upon which a judicial decision will be based.  Fact-finders 
are on notice to resist being gulled by the lawyer’s attempts to persuade them, 
whether the lawyer is acting in good or bad faith (for this will likely be 
unknown to the fact-finder), and thus the lawyer’s audience resists the 
miscarriage of justice that occurs when a party deceives or cheats the public.  
While the suspension of disbelief is the “voluntary withholding of 
scepticism”243 on the part of the actor’s audience, the lawyer’s audience—in 
particular, the judge and jury—can serve as responsible fact-finders only by 
engaging their heightened skepticism while listening to the opposed 
arguments. 
 This is to say that their complementary audiences meet actors and lawyers 
at different rhetorical points: Sir Ian’s audience knows (or is reasonably 
expected to know) that he is not Hamlet the Dane, and yet Sir Ian need suffer 
no conscience for having lied to the audience; meanwhile, the judge and jury 
know (and are not only reasonably expected but professionally relied upon to 
know) that the lawyer is performing the speech of the party without necessarily 
claiming that his propositions are true.  The more skillfully the fact-finder 
fulfills the epistemological rigors of his juridical role, the more comfortably 
the lawyer can expect that she will be understood to be conveying the party’s 
account (which to the best of her knowledge and belief, may or may not be 
true) rather than to be promoting in them a false belief.  Indeed, actually or 
constructively knowingly promoting false belief in the fact-finder is 
antithetical to the lawyer’s function as an officer of the court: “the actor’s 
misrepresentation . . . is an act that does not conform to the maieutic ethic.”244 
 Ironically, Markovits asserts that promoting false belief “is an essential 
part of the adversary legal process, whose claims to function as a truth-
generating mechanism require that courts treat lawyers’ statements as serious 
propositions, in the sense of being open to believing what they assert.”245  But 
the audience’s openness to belief must be accompanied by its heightened—not 
relaxed—skepticism if the legal process can have any fair or legitimate claim 
to function as a truth-generating mechanism.  While the fact-finder must be 
open-minded, he must not be credulous, for forming facts under too low an 
epistemological standard contributes to the arbitrariness of the resulting 
decisionmaking and undermines the epistemological bases of the rule of law.246  
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In other words, the fact-finder has a duty to apply its faculties of honesty, 
intelligence, integrity and good judgment to weighing the evidence itself,247 
putting that evidence to the test by applying the requisite standard of proof 
while disregarding statements by the lawyer that are not supported by such 
proof.248 
 The second element of the lawyer-as-actor analogy that Markovits sees is 
finely similar to the first: the former focuses on what a lawyer’s statement 
asserts, and the latter emphasizes what the lawyer asserts through her 
statement.  Markovits claims that “lawyers have far less role-distance [from 
their statements] than [do] actors,” because unlike actors, lawyers cannot 
“comfortably step out of their roles to speak in their own voices and denounce 
the characters that they play.”249  Of course, it would be unprofessional for an 
actor to do this as well—unless doing so were part of the play, part of the 
professional performance itself—but Markovits urges that the lawyer is to 
pretend (ironically) to be sincere in representing the client, so to lend 
credibility to her client’s cause.  While acknowledging that the lawyer is 
prohibited from personally vouching for her client as demonstrated in MRPC 
3.4(e), he argues that “it is quite possible to lie even without vouching, simply 
by employing other means in the service of an intent to deceive.”250  However, 
the Rule does not tolerate even an allusion—neither a covert nor hinted 
suggestion—from the lawyer of “any matter that . . . will not be supported by 
admissible evidence.”251 
 So, if the lawyer does not believe that an argument that she advances on 
behalf of her client has evidentiary support, either because the evidence is 
misleading or is false (in which case it is not admissible, and cannot properly 
 
and base its verdict strictly upon the testimony and exhibits received in evidence at trial.”); id. at 
12–13. 
 247. Id. at 13 (“There is no more valuable work that the average citizen can perform in 
support of our Government than the full and honest discharge of jury duty.  The effectiveness of 
the democratic system itself is largely measured by the integrity, the intelligence, and the general 
quality of citizenship of the jurors who serve in our courts.”); see also id. at 12 regarding the 
impropriety of arbitrary fact-finding (“It would be dishonest for a judge to decide a case by 
tossing a coin.  It would be just as dishonest for a juror to do so.”). 
 248. Id. at 10 (“The opening and closing statements of the lawyers are not evidence.  A juror 
should disregard any statements made by a lawyer in argument that have not been proved by the 
evidence.”). 
 249. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 38 (italics retained). 
 250. Id. at 39. 
 251. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(e) (2010): 
A lawyer shall not: . . . (e) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not 
reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert 
personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a 
personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability 
of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused[.] 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2012] WHAT IS A LAWYER? 491 
serve as the basis of any argument), then she violates the Rule simply by 
stating it—let alone by pretending to believe it as she states it.  The lawyer’s 
epistemological relation to her statement before the court must be that she 
believes that the statement might be true; she poses a proposition, the truth of 
which is to be determined by the fact-finder in accordance with the adversary 
system’s epistemological division of labor.  This is not to say that the 
statement is actually neither true nor false until the fact-finder declares it to be 
one or the other; instead, it means that the lawyer has investigated the 
statement and believes that it is not false and might be true, and that the fact-
finder will consider it in light of other statements before him in determining the 
statement’s epistemological status within the legal system. 
 Markovits fairly characterizes as a lie a lawyer’s apparent sincerity even as 
she disbelieves what she states to the fact-finder, and he describes this feigned 
sincerity as a practical necessity, “a literal demand on the lawyer,”252 a 
“strategem . . . that is probably an inevitable feature of every adversary legal 
practice,”253 for if the audience knows that the lawyer does not believe her 
statement, then the lawyer has failed to be persuasive.254  But a lawyer’s 
perceived practical need to win a case for her client is not an official and a 
fortiori not her sole nor overriding duty: the lawyer’s duty to represent a party 
before the court is not an unbounded duty to succeed in convincing the fact-
finder to favor her client—not a duty to mislead the fact-finder, to mis-
represent the party in order to win.255  To conceive of the lawyer’s professional 
duty only as a duty to win for the client is to mistake her professional identity, 
to forget that the lawyer who represents a client is simultaneously performing 
two roles: professionally, she performs as an officer of the court as she 
represents the party. 
 We can assess how Markovits’ characterization of the lawyer-as-actor 
argument fares in light of the epistemological division of labor between 
advocate and tribunal, and of the lawyer’s situation as an actor who performs 
in nested maieutic roles.  The first element is that like actors’ statements, 
“lawyers’ statements do not assert anything, and certainly do not assert what 
they literally say[.]”256  As an officer of the court, the lawyer representing a 
party before the court makes a statement to the court on behalf of the party.  
This statement cannot be a judgment about the client, for if it were, then the 
adversarial division of labor would be violated.  Instead, the lawyer’s statement 
is a proposition put forth for consideration by the court: it proposes a way of 
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viewing the matter in issue, which the court will consider seriously as it 
performs its part in the division of epistemological labor.  The court’s part is to 
“find” the facts considering all the evidence before it: to assign truth-values to 
the lawyers’ propositions.  The lawyer does not determine the truth-value of 
her own statement—does not assert that her statement is true.  Before making 
her statement to the court, however, she will have screened its content to assure 
that the statement is not false or misleading.  In this way, she acts as a filter on 
behalf of the court, preventing inappropriate matter from distracting the fact-
finder, while also acting as a portal for the client that translates his experience 
into matter appropriate for legal action.  Thus the fact of her statement certifies 
only that there is (or is reasonably expected to be) evidentiary support for its 
content, and not that she believes the content to be true.  Hence, the statement 
proposes, but does not assert, its content. 
 The second element is that like actors, lawyers personally are dissociated 
from their statements.  To remain an officer of the court, the lawyer must 
maintain a professional detachment from the client—otherwise the lawyer 
becomes the client, and does not professionally represent him as a party.  This 
dissociation relies not only on the lawyer’s epistemological agnosticism 
regarding the truth-value of her statements to the court, but also on the court’s 
recognition that she is lending her voice to another.  The audience’s 
professionalism257 entails an a priori understanding and expectation that the 
lawyer will represent someone else, and the formalism of the court proceedings 
further signals to the audience the need for its professionalism. 
ii. Harmonies and Dissonances 
 Contrasting with its theme that a lawyer’s ordinary lying and cheating arise 
inevitably from the structure of the adversary system, Markovits’ treatment of 
professional detachment harmonizes for a moment with mine in explaining 
both the lawyer’s partisanship and the limits of that partisanship: “Most 
generally, fidelity and negative capability condemn forms of lying that help 
clients to misrepresent rather than to express themselves and forms of cheating 
that close off rather than open up the judicial process.”258  This statement 
wholly applies to the maieutic ethic. 
 Markovits offers his lawyerly virtues as a hope that might sustain the 
lawyer’s personal integrity, for “professional ethics requires lawyers to betray 
their own senses of truth and justice in ways that contravene the ethic of self-
 
 257. Professionalism poses a distinction between one’s acting as an institutional entity (e.g., 
in the role of a judge, juror or lawyer), and one’s acting simply as a private person.  Since one 
person is both an institutional entity and a private person, professionalism entails one’s awareness 
that this distinction is called for and one’s commitment and ability to realize it in practice. 
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assertion that dominates ordinary morality[.]”259  But my analysis of the 
lawyer’s dual roles and the role hierarchy in which she functions shows that 
the lawyer-as-actor analogy is not so facile, and thus remains useful: the nested 
structure of her roles harmonizes her identity, not only affording her the 
possibility of integrity but requiring it of her if she is to function ethically as a 
person and as a vital organ of the legal system.  The lawyer’s underlying and 
limiting identity as an officer of the court, if realized (as it should be), can do 
much to prevent the lawyer from betraying her own sense of truth and 
justice—not personally through self-assertion—but professionally through the 
assertion that she is always already a court officer. 
 Markovits and Charles Curtis both have identified lying260 and cheating261 
as vices necessary to the lawyer.  Both tie these vices to a division of labor 
between the lawyer and the judge: for Markovits this division is moral and 
gives rise to the lawyerly vices, whereas for Curtis the division tracks an 
ostensibly neat division between fact and law.262  Both sense limits to these 
vices,263 and both preserve a space for the lawyer’s exercise of professional 
(not personal moral) judgment.  Curtis describes the lawyer’s stoic detachment 
that allows her to provide objective counsel;264 this detachment resonates with 
the maieutic bracketing and the locus of independent professional judgment 
that I describe, Gordon’s empty stage, Spaulding’s thin professional identity, 
and Markovits’ negative capability.  Interestingly, both Curtis and Markovits 
“[c]ompare the lawyer with the poet”265: in Curtis’ view, the lawyer’s zeal and 
identity with the client require that “you suspend both belief and disbelief” just 
as “[i]f you read poetry as poetry.”266 
 
 259. Id. at 5. 
 260. Curtis, supra note 87, at 8 (“He must lie . . . beyond the point where he could 
permissibly lie for himself.”). 
 261. Id. at 9 (“A lawyer is required to be disingenuous.  He is required to make statements as 
well as arguments which he does not believe in.”). 
 262. In Curtis’ analysis responsibility for fact rests with the lawyer, while that for law belongs 
to the judge, and thus a lawyer may hide unfavorable factual information from the judge but not 
unfavorable law.  Id. at 11 (“The court has priority over the client in matters of law and the client 
has a priority over the court in matters of fact.”); see also id. at 10.  This distinction is facile, most 
obviously when the judge is the fact-finder. 
 263. Id. at 7 (“I take it that it is inadmissible to lie to the court.”).  Yet Curtis also assumes 
that despite the lawyer’s ability to hide unfavorable facts, in court “[t]he whole has been shaken 
out into the sun[.]”  Id. at 12. 
For Markovits, the lawyerly virtues in a sense limit the vices.  See supra note 258 and 
accompanying text. 
 264. Curtis, supra note 87, at 18 (“The full discharge of a lawyer’s duty to his client requires 
him to withhold something.”); see also id. at 18–20. 
 265. Id. at 23. 
 266. Id. at 21. 
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 Curtis senses but is ultimately confused by the primacy of the lawyer’s role 
as an officer of the court.  Citing Lord Brougham and describing the lawyer’s 
devotion to her client as “entire,” Curtis yet asks, “How far must a lawyer 
accompany his client and turn his back on the court?”267  Here he struggles 
with the duality of the lawyer’s professional identity, lapsing into the idea that 
the lawyer must either be her client’s advocate or an officer of the court.  
Although he argues that lawyers must lie, for a moment he realizes that a 
lawyer cannot lie to the court, because “[a] lawyer’s duty to his client cannot 
rise higher than its source, which is the court”268.  Even though he notes that it 
is the court who requires her to advocate, he sees this duality of professional 
identity as “paradoxical”269.  The identity structure here presented resolves the 
apparent paradox: the lawyer’s professional identities are nested, with the 
fundamental identity as an officer of the court constraining the subsequent 
identity as a legal representative of the client. 
 Without the limits flowing from the lawyer’s function as an officer of the 
court in the structure of the adversarial legal system, lawyers’ unbridled 
actions as mere client agents cannot sustain their commitments to their 
professional roles, and instead capture their official power for an incomplete 
set of private interests, undermining the possibility of justice—and further 
undermining the legitimacy of the legal system by failing to justify courts’ 
reliance on lawyers.  Thus, I maintain that the lawyer’s identity as an officer of 
the court IS her distinctively lawyerly virtue, which entails the maieusis of the 
commitments and values of the legal system through her professional 
performance. 
C. Reconstruction As an Answer to the Problem of Responsibility 
Gerald Postema raised the concern that a lawyer’s thick identification with her 
role would render her irresponsible, and thus threaten her integrity.  He 
referred to the problematic role that he had in mind as the “standard 
conception” of the lawyer as a partisan whose “sole allegiance is to the 
client . . . [w]ithin, but all the way up to, the limits of the law,”270 and as a 
neutral with respect to the lawyer’s own opinion of the client’s morality.  He 
framed the problem with the standard conception as a “problem of 
responsibility”271; by identifying too thickly with this role, the lawyer finds 
herself in the situation where Markovits meets her: 
[T]he lawyer is under great temptation to refuse to accept responsibility for his 
professional actions and their consequences.  Moreover, except when his 
 
 267. Id. at 5. 
 268. Id. at 7. 
 269. Id. at 3. 
 270. Postema, supra note 85, at 73 (italics retained). 
 271. Id. at 74. 
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beliefs coincide with those of his client, he lives with a recurring dilemma: he 
must engage in activities, make arguments, and present positions which he 
himself does not endorse or embrace.  The lawyer’s integrity is put into 
question by the mere exercise of the duties of his profession.272 
To prevent the lawyer’s disintegration, Postema contemplates “forging a 
concrete alternative conception”273 of the lawyer’s role, which he sees as a 
formidable task. 
 My analysis frames the problem of responsibility as a problem of 
professional identity: how is the lawyer situated in the legal system, and what 
is her function there?  This approach identifies an already present concrete 
alternative conception of the lawyer that preserves her integrity: her identity as 
an officer of the court. 
 The officer-of-the-court analysis provides an “integrity-preserving role-
based redescription” for the lawyer that Markovits calls for, but one that does 
not necessarily rely on the “authoritative insular[ity]”274 of the lawyer’s role 
from which modernity abjects her.  So, where Markovits sees that “as lawyers 
are called on”—that is, interpellated by courts—”to integrate clients into a 
process of adjudication that would otherwise be alien, they are denied the 
cultural resources needed to shoulder the ethical burdens that arise on 
answering this call.  These burdens threaten to dis-integrate the lawyers 
themselves”275—I see instead a more felicitous outcome for the lawyer who 
shoulders the ethical responsibilities of the officer of the court whom she 
becomes in answering the court’s interpellation. 
 The decisions to focus on the individual lawyer and adversariness per se 
are errors of scale in this debate.  Framing the lawyer as an advocate only—
ignoring her manifestation by, for, and subject to the court—is a failure to 
appreciate the full tapestry of our Constitutionally provided social order, 
marginalizing the lawyer’s duties to the judicial powers276 provided by the 
Constitution.  The bar is both the court and the legal profession of which the 
lawyer is a member, and the client has not only individual, private interests but 
a public interest in the rule of law.  When we survey the design of our social 
order, we perceive the lawyer not as a mere tool of the client, but as an 
articulate instrument in the administration of justice. 
  
 
 272. Id. at 77. 
 273. Id. at 82. 
 274. MARKOVITS, supra note 89, at 243. 
 275. Id. at 13. 
 276. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Oxford English Dictionary Online, judicial, adj. and n., 1 (2d 
ed. 1989) (“Of or belonging to judgement in a court of law, or to a judge in relation to this 
function; pertaining to the administration of justice.”). 
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